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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON AUDITOR LIABILITY
MAY 2016
JEFFREY PICKERD, B.S., MAcc., BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor M. David Piercey
Auditor liability is an important topic of accounting research as auditors respond
to a constantly changing financial reporting and regulatory environment. Through three
independent essays, I intend to explore how estimate uncertainty, financial statement
aggregation, audit quality indicators, a company's investor base, and the size of the
alleged misstatement can impact auditor liability both in the courtroom, as determined by
jurors, and in out of court settlement, as determined by attorneys. I find that jurors do
hold the auditor more likely to be negligent when audit quality indicators suggest the
auditors did a poor quality audit. I also find that jurors hold auditors to be more negligent
when both estimate uncertainty is low and the income statement is disaggregated. This
juror finding is in contrast to lawyers where I find that high estimate uncertainty causes
auditors’ lawyers to believe that the auditors are more vulnerable for failing to detect a
material misstatement and make more concessions in out-of-court settlement negotiation.
Together, these studies have a number of important implications. First, the
impact of high estimate uncertainty on auditor liability can go in opposite directions
depending on whether the case disposition is determined by jurors or by lawyers
negotiating settlement. Second, auditors’ legal counsel may erroneously concede during
settlement negotiations based on incorrect beliefs about their vulnerability to jurors.
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Third, while accounting research has focused on juror judgments to proxy for auditor
litigation risk, auditors may face very different litigation risk in out-of-court settlement,
where the vast majority of auditor liability is determined.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Through three independent essays, I intend to explore how estimate uncertainty,
financial statement aggregation, audit quality indicators, a company's investor base, and
the size of the alleged misstatement can impact auditor liability both in the courtroom, as
determined by jurors, and in out of court settlement, as determined by attorneys.
My first essay on auditor liability investigates how a proposed auditing standard
(AQIs), an existing financial accounting practice (aggregated vs. disaggregated financial
statements), and a company’s investor base (institutional vs. individual investors), impact
jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence following an undetected misstatement in the
financial statements. I develop predictions suggesting that these three factors may interact
in ways that standard setters do not anticipate. For example, my predictions suggest that
the level of aggregation in the financial statements impacts the effectiveness of AQIs in
informing jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence. In addition, these effects differ
depending on whether the company’s investor base is primarily individual or institutional
investors. Contrary to my predictions, jurors only rely on audit quality indicators to
determine auditor liability.
My second essay examines how financial statement aggregation and estimate
uncertainty impacts juror assessments of auditor liability. I find that jurors hold auditors
to a higher standard of care when (jointly) estimate uncertainty is low and the income
statement is disaggregated. In contrast, auditors are held to a lower standard of care when
either the income statement is disaggregated or estimate uncertainty is high (or both).
1

This interaction on the standard of care for auditors, in turn, impacts negligence
judgments against auditors. These joint effects occur regardless of whether the range of
estimate uncertainty is larger than or smaller than the material misstatement. While prior
research suggests that aggregation makes auditors less likely to correct misstatements, my
findings suggest (ironically) that it can simultaneously protect auditors from the legal
risks of failing to correct some of those material misstatements.
My third essay proposes that the effect of estimate uncertainty on auditor liability
depends on whether the case is judged by jurors or negotiated in out-of-court settlement.
Using the same experimental task, I predict and find that high estimate uncertainty causes
auditors’ lawyers to believe that the auditors are more vulnerable for failing to detect a
material misstatement and make more concessions in out-of-court settlement negotiation,
regardless of whether the misstatement is in an aggregated or disaggregated line-item.
Consistent with my theory, these directionally opposite effects stem from lawyers’
inability to predict jurors’ judgments accurately.
Together, these studies have a number of implications. First, the impact of high
estimate uncertainty on auditor liability can go in opposite directions depending on
whether the case disposition is determined by jurors or by lawyers negotiating settlement.
Second, auditors’ legal counsel may erroneously concede during settlement negotiations
based on incorrect beliefs about their vulnerability to jurors. Third, while accounting
research has focused on juror judgments to proxy for auditor litigation risk, auditors may
face very different litigation risk in out-of-court settlement, where the vast majority of
auditor liability is determined.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACT OF AUDIT QUALITY INDICATORS, FINANCIAL
STATEMENT AGGREGATION, AND INVESTOR BASE ON AUDITOR LIABILITY
2.1 Introduction
Recently, the PCAOB and other auditing standard setting bodies have been
contemplating mandatory reporting of audit quality indicators (CAQ 2014; PCAOB 2013
Dickens, Fay and Reich 2014). These audit quality indicators (hereafter, “AQIs”) will
provide stakeholders engagement-level insight into the quality of the audits being
performed by firms. While the AQIs promise to bring greater transparency to the audit
process, little empirical research has been done examining the use and perception of these
measures by various stakeholders and other important accounting decision-makers. Thus
far, much of the debate surrounding AQIs has focused on which metrics could be used to
capture audit quality (e.g., Jonas 2013; Martin 2013; CAQ 2014). In this study, I
investigate the implications of AQI on jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence.
Disclosure of AQIs has been a highly controversial proposal among audit firms
concerned with the implications for their litigation risks (Bedard, Johnstone, and Smith
2010). In this study, I investigate different conditions in which disclosure of AQIs may or
may not elevate auditor liability.
While auditors may be facing new requirements to disclose AQIs, GAAP allows
companies significant discretion in the level of disaggregated information they disclose in
the financial statements. As Libby and Emmett (2014) review, at a minimum, GAAP only
requires that operating expenses (including all cost of goods sold, selling, general, and
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administrative expenses) be broken down into two line-items on the income statement.
While companies can voluntarily elect to disaggregate the income statement more (and
many do), there is a large variance in the level of disaggregation in publicly filed annual
reports, as well as a large variance in which expenses are included in a particular lineitem, even within the same industry (Libby and Emmett 2014). GAAP is mostly silent on
the question of line-item aggregation, and the few statements by the FASB on it have
alternated between positive and negative viewpoints on its costs and benefits for users of
the financial statements (e.g., FASB 1984, 1979; Libby and Emett 2014).
In this study, I investigate how AQIs and the level of financial statement
aggregation may jointly impact jurors’ assessments of auditor liability in a litigation
context. In addition, I examine the effects of these variables when the company’s investor
base includes both individual and institutional investors. Compared to individual
investors, institutional are more sophisticated (e.g., Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005). That
is, institutional investors have more resources and ability to process available information
behind their investment decisions. Compared to novices, experts assimilate informational
cues into their judgments and decisions more efficiently and more effectively (e.g.,
Johnson 1988), and are therefore generally expected by others to perform better in
judgment settings that involve incorporating various informational cues into their
decisions (e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997; Mnookin 2008). Because of this, I theorize
that jurors will place different expectations on institutional investors and individual
investors in their reactions to AQIs and aggregated financial statement information.
Jurors will assign blame for investors’ losses following an undetected misstatement to
multiple parties, including to the investors themselves (Arel, Jennings, Pany, and Reckers
4

2012). I expect that jurors will assign blame to auditors differently depending on the type
of investor and their different abilities to process AQIs and aggregated financial
statement information.
My predictions give rise to possible unintended consequences of AQIs and
aggregated financial statements. For example, when the investor base consists primarily
of individual investors, I expect that jurors will form auditor negligence judgments
consistent with AQIs being diagnostic of audit quality. That is, when the plaintiffs are
primarily individual investors, jurors will hold auditors more negligent for an ex post
undetected misstatement as the AQIs indicate other negative ex ante audit quality cues.
However, when plaintiffs are primarily institutional investors, I expect that jurors will
expect these more expert investors to have assimilated AQIs into their judgments more
fully as an ex ante audit quality cue prior to (or concurrent with) their investment
decision. Consequently, when AQIs are negative, I expect that jurors will hold
institutional investors relatively more responsible for their decision to invest in the
company, having invested in a company with a lower quality auditor. As jurors hold
investors more responsible for their own investment losses, they tend to hold auditors less
responsible for them (Arel et al. 2012). As a result of this theory, I develop hypotheses
that AQIs may have very different and possibly even opposite effects on auditor
negligence judgments, depending on the type of investors who experienced the losses.
My findings provide insight for standard setters potential impacts that could arise
from mandating disclosure of AQIs. Specifically, jurors only believe auditors to more
likely be negligent when the AQIs indicate the auditor performed a lower quality audit.

5

2.2 Hypothesis Development
2.2.1 Audit Quality Indicators
While investors and other financial statement users can use ex post outcome
measures as noisy proxies for audit quality (e.g., discretionary accruals, restatements,
propensity to issue going concern opinions), very little information is available about the
quality of ex ante audit processes. Furthermore, ex post outcomes are a mixture of audit
quality and financial reporting quality (i.e., auditor behavior and manager behavior),
whereas the quality of audit inputs and processes are more directly controlled by the
auditor. In addition, ex post outcomes (even those related to misstatements) are noisier
signals of audit quality (than ex ante input and process information) since audits only
provide reasonable assurance against negative outcomes, but absolute assurance of ex
ante due professional care (Peecher and Piercey 2008). Because of this, and because of
the high social costs of undetected misstatements in high-profile accounting failures,
investors, regulators, and groups have called for more disclosure from audit firms on the
quality of their audit processes (e.g., PCAOB 2012; POB 2006; Pritchard & Puri 2006;
PCA 2012). Recent research shows that investors in particular call for more information
about specific audit inputs and processes, rather than outputs (Christensen, Glover, Omer
and Shelley 2014).
One proposed solution has been to require firms to measure and disclose a
standard set of audit quality indicators (AQIs) (e.g., PCAOB 2013; Jonas 2013; CAQ
2014). While much of the ensuing debate has focused on what measures should be
required (e.g., CAQ 2014, Martin 2013; Christensen et al. 2014), there has also been both
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strong opposition and support for requiring AQIs and their disclosure at all. As Dickens,
Fay, and Reich (2014) note, the frequent expectation expressed in the debate is that AQIs,
including firm- and engagement-specific data, would eventually be made public to help
investors and other stakeholders assess audit quality. Proponents of AQIs argue that
public disclosure would be the very point of AQIs since there is otherwise a paucity of
data about the quality of audit processes and specific areas of the audit, especially at the
engagement level. Opponents of AQIs argue that their disclosure could cause audit firms
to audit myopically to meet the measures (i.e., alter their behavior to posture for the AQIs
rather than to minimize detection risk), out of fear of increased litigation risk (Bedard et
al. (2010). I investigate the implications of AQIs for auditor liability in a juror setting to
investigate when AQIs elevate or diminish auditors’ liability risks. This responds to the
call of Kachelmeier and King (2002) to use of experiments to test the implications of
proposed new disclosures (such as AQIs) before they are implemented or soon after (e.g.,
Fanning, Agoglia, and Piercey 2015).
2.2.2 Financial Statement Line-Item Aggregation
A large archival research investigates the implications of business segment
aggregation or disaggregation in the financial statements, but a relatively small and recent
research literature has begun examining the implications of financial statement line-item
aggregation or disaggregation (see Libby and Emett 2014 for a review). International
accounting standards generally require some disaggregation of the income statement into
distinct line-items, although their rules give companies significant latitude (IASB 2009;
Libby and Brown 2013). In contrast, GAAP provides almost no guidance to companies
about the level of aggregation or disaggregation that is appropriate (Libby and Emett
7

2014). For example, Libby and Brown (2014) illustrate alternative representations of an
income statement, both acceptable under GAAP, that show operating expenses in as few
as two and as many as twelve line-items.
Most research so far has investigated the effects of line-item aggregation on
investor decision making. Elliott et al. (2015) use an experimental market in which
investors receive earnings information that is either aggregated, disaggregated into
recurring earnings components (i.e., income from continuing operations) and nonrecurring events (i.e., extraordinary items), or consisting of recurring components only.
Aggregation improved market efficiency overall, but long investors tended to mis-use
disaggregated non-recurring events. Bonner et al. (2014) find that how investors
aggregated or disaggregated information depends on whether and how it combines or
disaggregates combinations of gains and losses. Finally, Bloomfield et al. (2015) find no
significant effects of line-item disaggregation on credit analysts’ judgments, and
conclude that standards requiring disaggregation may not meaningfully impact users’
judgments.
In an auditing context, Libby and Brown (2013) demonstrate that auditors are
more willing to accept misstated financial statements when the misstatement is
aggregated together with other, cleaner financial statement accounts in the same lineitem. This suggests that aggregation potentially increases systemic audit risk (the risk of
materially misstated financial statements with a clean audit opinion), and that managers
can potentially use aggregation as a means of concealing earnings management from
auditors (cf. Luippold, Kida, Piercey and Smith 2014). Furthermore, in the second study
of my dissertation, I find that jurors find auditors less negligent when an undetected
8

misstatement is aggregated with other, cleaner financial statement accounts than when it
is disaggregated in the financial statements, but only for misstatements stemming from
accounting estimates of relatively low inherent uncertainty. I found this pattern of results
even though, ex post, jurors believed that auditors had an unconditionally high obligation
to prevent the undetected misstatement, regardless of aggregation, disaggregation, or
estimate uncertainty.
2.2.3 Investor Base
Prior accounting research has shown that stakeholders in a company perceive
differences in vulnerability between individual and institutional investors (Kang 2015).
Individual investors might appear vulnerable for a variety of reasons. Institutional
investors are often highly sophisticated investors, highly educated in finance, economic
modeling, and accounting while many individual investors lack even a general business
background. As a result, individual investors, generally speaking, will have less ability to
interpret and use the accounting information provided.
Another reason individual investors could be perceived to be more vulnerable
than institutional investors is because they have less access to information. Institutional
investors, by definition, are part of financial firms, investing groups, or other large
organizations. These groups often provide access to specialized reports, databases, and
content normally unavailable outside of the organization. Without access to additional
information provided by large financial institutions, individual investors will be more
reliant on the audit opinion of the financial statements and less able to supplement their
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investment decisions with outside sources which could give them better indication of the
quality of the assurance being provided.
Finally, individual investors often will lack the same economic resources that
institutional investors have. A common proxy in the archival literature for institutional
investors are investment managers who are required to file Form 13F disclosures with the
SEC. One of the requirements for an investment manager who files Form 13F is that they
must manage at least $100 million in securities. Individual investors, with their much
smaller portfolios, will likely be perceived as being more vulnerable because the same
loss or harm that would not be noticed by a institutional investor could devastate a
individual investor.
2.2.4 Joint Effects of Aggregation and Investor Type
Pitesa and Thau (2014) find that harm to a more vulnerable group results in
harsher moral judgments by third party observers. Because individual investors are a
more vulnerable investor base, I would expect higher assessments of auditor negligence
when the company’s investor base is primarily composed of individual investors.
However, the impact of a company’s investor base is likely to be moderated by
the level of financial statement aggregation. Prior accounting research has found that
auditors and jurors perceive misstatements to be more material when the income
statement accounts are disaggregated into more line-items (Libby and Brown 2013). As
alleged misstatements are perceived to be more material, they are likely to be perceived
to impact and harm investors more. As a result, disaggregating the income statement
would be likely increase jurors’ negligence assessments against the auditor, since it
10

increases perceptions of the materiality of misstatement. However, the impact of a more
negative outcome on jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence should be larger when it
results in losses to a more vulnerable group. As a result, this increase in auditor liability is
likely to be greater when the company’s investor base is primarily individual investors
rather than institutional investors. Individual investors, who are perceived as being more
vulnerable than institutional investors, will be perceived as lacking the ability to cope
with the losses, particularly losses that appear larger and more material. In contrast, for
institutional investors, while they will also have higher negligence judgments when the
financial statements are disaggregated, they will be perceived as having a greater ability
to cope and deal with losses of any size than the more vulnerable individual investors,
and as a consequence will have a smaller increase in negligence judgments. I formally
state my interaction hypothesis between investor base and financial statement as follows.
H1: Disaggregating the financial statements will lead to a greater increase in
jurors’ negligence judgments for individual investors than for institutional
investors.
2.2.5 Disaggregation and Audit Quality Indicators (AQIs)
Examples of typical AQIs recently proposed include number of hours incurred by
specialists and the national office, the audit team’s industry experience, training hours of
audit personnel, engagement hours, and CPA certification of the audit staff. While these
individual AQI metrics may not directly relate to the causal process behind a specific
undetected misstatement in a particular area of the audit and of the financial statements,
they will likely provide jurors rough impressions of the quality of the auditor. Audit
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quality is a difficult construct to define (Francis 2004, 2011). Furthermore, forming a
single mental representation is a persistently difficult task for individuals (Camerer and
Johnson 1997). In particular, juror’s affective reactions to the AQIs are more likely to
persist in their working memory than the specific details of the AQIs themselves (cf.
Kida, Smith and Maletta 1998). That is, whether the AQIs are generally good or bad is
the most likely trait to influence juror decision making further (cf. Kida and Smith 1995).
Finally, as jurors sense that they have incomplete information with which to evaluate
auditors and attempt to fill in the gaps (cf., Peecher and Piercey 2008), they may assume
that, if the AQIs are consistently positive or negative, that other, similar signals of audit
quality exist as well.
Normally, the higher and better the AQIs are, the more likely the auditor has
performed a good audit and the less likely jurors will hold the auditor negligent.
However, prior research indicates that the impact of ex ante audit quality cues is likely to
be diminished or eliminated when negative outcome information about an undetected
material misstatement is provided (Kadous 2000, Kadous 2001). In my setting, financial
statement aggregation or disaggregation does not actually alter the existence of a material
misstatement itself. However, the second study in my dissertation shows aggregation
(disaggregation) of the income statement can make an undetected material misstatement
appear less (more) material, even when the magnitude of the material misstatement and
its impact on net income are held constant. Thus, I still expect that when the financial
statements are disaggregated, jurors will perceive the ex post misstatement to be more
material, and will react less to the AQIs as ex ante indicators of audit quality, as they
assess auditor negligence. Thus, when financial statements are disaggregated, I would
12

expect that AQIs would not impact the jurors’ negligence judgments to the same degree
as they would if the financial statements were aggregated. When the financial statements
are aggregated, jurors perceive the alleged misstatement to be less severe and are more
likely to react primarily to the ex ante measures of audit quality. Thus, when the financial
statements are aggregated, I expect jurors to use the AQIs in their negligence judgments
more and judge negligence as increasing when the AQIs show decreasing levels of audit
quality. I formally state this interaction prediction as follows:
H2: The difference between jurors’ negligence assessments for good, mixed, and
bad AQIs will be greater when the financial statements are aggregated than when
they are disaggregated.
If supported, this hypothesis suggests that jurors’ attention to ex ante audit cues
depends not only on whether or not negative outcome information is provided (Kadous
2000, 2001), but also extends to the formatting of a material misstatement (i.e.,
aggregated with other accounts or not), holding constant the material misstatement itself,
when it is provided, and its impact on earnings.
2.2.6 The Joint Effect of Investor Base and Audit Quality Indicators
An extensive literature in psychology distinguishes between conditions in which
people have the ability to make good or bad decisions for themselves, and conditions in
which people are the target of others’ good or bad decisions (Eshleman 2004, Gray et al.
2007, Gray and Wegner 2009, Bernstein 1998, Bratman 1987). Decisions of innocence,
victimization, and blameworthiness are influenced by whether individuals are relatively
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more ability to make good or bad decisions, or whether they are the target of others’ good
or bad decisions (Alicke 2000, Pizarro et al. 2003).
Institutional have more resources for and are more expert at processing available
information behind their investment decisions (e.g., Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005;
Piotriski and Roulstone 2004). In contrast, individual investors are more likely to trade on
poor information, to misuse information, or trade without information (e.g., DeLong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1989, 1991; Fanning et al. 2015). As such, individual
investors seem particularly dependent on corporate governance mechanisms in order to
realize safe investment outcomes.
Compared to novices, experts are generally expected by others to perform better
in judgment settings that involve incorporating various informational cues into their
decisions (e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997; Johnson 1988; Mnookin 2008). Because of
this, jurors are likely to place different expectations on institutional investors and
individual investors. Because audits provide only reasonable assurance against
undetected misstatements, investors retain some residual risk of undetected material
misstatements, even after an independent audit is conducted. Consistent with this,
empirical evidence shows that jurors will assign blame for investors’ losses following an
undetected misstatement to multiple parties, including to the investors themselves Arel et
al. (2012). Accordingly, I expect that jurors will hold institutional investors to a higher
standard for assuming residual misstatement risk and for processing available cues than
they hold individual investors. That is, jurors will hold institutional investors’ investment
decisions in a “buyer beware” mindset, in which investors are more responsible to
internalize all of the risks that they face, including the implications of AQIs.
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These different expectations for individual and institutional investors overall
suggest that jurors’ will view the implications of AQIs differently depending on the type
of investors who lost money due to an audit failure. When the investor base consists
primarily of individual investors, I expect that jurors will form auditor negligence
judgments consistent with their affective reactions to the AQIs. That is, when the
plaintiffs are primarily individual investors, I expect that jurors will (quite simply) hold
auditors more (less) responsible for plaintiffs’ losses when AQIs are more suggestive of
other low (high) audit quality cues.
In contrast, when the investor base consists primarily of institutional investors,
jurors will recall the valence of the AQIs (cf. Smith and Kida 1995), and will more likely
to expect that these more expert investors should have assimilated signals of audit quality
into their judgments more fully as they made their investment decisions. Consequently,
when AQIs are negative, I expect that jurors will hold institutional investors relatively
more responsible for their decision to invest in the company, having chosen to rely on a
lower-quality auditor. This is consistent with prior auditor liability research which has
shown that the more knowledgeable a person is to process relevant information and make
a judgment, the higher the blame they are assessed for failing to properly process that
information when the judgment is proven to be incorrect (Grenier, Pomeroy, and Stern
2015). It is also consistent with prior research suggesting that jurors have different
affective reactions to different plaintiffs (e.g., Mazella and Feingold 1994) and as a result
would likely hold them to different standards for their investment decisions. As jurors
hold institutional investors more responsible for their own investment losses, they would
then tend to hold auditors less responsible for them (Arel et al. 2012).
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Similarly, when the AQIs are relatively positive, jurors will likely expect
institutional investors to have relied more (than individual investors would) on these (and
potentially other) indicators of audit quality. In the event of an undetected misstatement,
institutional investors were relying on ostensibly high quality auditors more, and
therefore appear less culpable for negative outcomes that follow. In this case, I expect
that jurors will hold auditors relatively more negligent when the plaintiffs are institutional
investors and the AQIs are positive. Note that this prediction is the opposite pattern that I
expect when the plaintiffs are individual investors. That is, jurors will hold auditors less
(more) responsible for institutional investors’ losses when AQIs are suggestive of low
(high) audit quality (i.e., “buyer beware”).
If supported, these different effects would also suggest that, when AQIs are
negative, jurors will hold auditors more responsible for individual investors’ losses than
for institutional investors’ losses (because they would ostensibly be more forewarned of
lower audit quality; “buyer beware”). In contrast, when AQIs are positive, jurors will
hold auditors more responsible for institutional investors’ losses than they would
individual investors’ losses (because institutional investors would process positive audit
quality signals more and therefore rely on them more). This discussion suggests an
interaction and specific simple effects. Stated formally:
H3a: AQI × Investor Base Interaction: Negative (positive) AQIs will
increase (decrease) jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence more when the
company’s investor base consists primarily of individual investors than
when it consists primarily of institutional investors.
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H3b: Simple effects of AQI given Investor Base: Negative (positive)
AQIs will increase (decrease) jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence
when the company’s investor base consists primarily of individual
investors, but will decrease (increase) jurors’ judgments of auditor
negligence when it consists primarily of institutional investors.
H3c: Simple effects of Investor Base given AQI: Jurors’ negligence judgments
will be higher for individual investors than institutional investors when the auditor
has better AQIs, however, jurors’ negligence judgments will be lower for
institutional investors than individual investors when AQIs are worse.
If supported, these hypotheses suggest that, contrary to concerns that disclosure of
AQIs will uniformly elevate auditors’ litigation risk, whether it does so or not will
depend on the type of investors primarily invested in a particular audit client.
2.2.7 Joint Effects of Investor Base, Audit Quality Indicators (AQIs), and Financial
Statement Aggregation
The interaction between AQIs and the company’s investor base (H3a) could also
be moderated by the level of aggregation in the company’s financial statements. In the
second study of my dissertation, disaggregating the financial statements makes the
alleged misstatement of an account appear more material and larger to jurors. As the
alleged misstatement appears larger and more material to jurors, they will pay more
attention to the perceived size of the misstatement and less on the company’s investor
base or the AQIs. That is, just as I expect disaggregation of a material misstatement to
cause the negative outcome to dominate jurors’ consideration of ex ante AQI cues (as I
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predicted in H2), I also expect disaggregation to of a material misstatement to dominate
jurors’ consideration of how different investors use and rely on ex ante AQI cues
differently. Thus in the disaggregated condition, I would expect the company’s investor
base and AQIs to be less influential on juror’s assessments of auditor negligence because
the participants are more heavily using the size of the alleged misstatement in their
decision-making. In contrast, when the financial statements are more aggregated, jurors
will be less influenced by the size of the alleged statement and base their decision more
on other factors, including the company’s AQIs and investor base. I formally state the
hypothesis as follows:
H4: The AQI × Investor Base interaction predicted in H3a will be larger when the
material misstatement is in an aggregated financial statement line-item than when
it is disaggregated.
If supported, this hypotheses suggests that the implications of AQI disclosure for
audit firms depends partially on whether investors are primarily institutional or individual
investors, particularly when financial statements are more aggregated. This conclusion
would inform the debate over disclosure of AQIs, in which opponents argue that they will
unfairly and unconditionally elevate auditors’ litigation risk. For example, negative AQIs
may not necessarily have this effect as strongly the investors are primarily institutional,
particularly when the financial statements are more aggregated.
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2.3 Method
2.3.1 Participants
I recruited 691 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk
participants have been shown to be at least as representative of the US adult population as
other common participant pools (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Buhrmester,
Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011) and commonly used in
prior accounting research needing potential juror participants (e.g., Grenier et al. 2014;
Maksymov and Nelson 2014).
I pre-screened potential participants in multiple ways. First, I only used
Mechanical Turk participants who had approval rates over XX% for at least XX past
Mechanical Turk tasks (which are based on the rate at which demanders of online labor
in the Mechanical Turk marketplace have approved and identified the individual
participant as providing quality work and responses), who are located in the United
States, and who have not taken the survey previously. Second, potential study
participants who matched this profile filled out a demographics survey indicating whether
they are US citizens at or above the age of 18 (which are requirements to be a juror in the
US). They answered this question without yet knowing that there would be an
opportunity to participate in an additional study for more compensation. Third, this
demographic survey also included an attention check question. Specifically, sole
instructions for the materials began with a notice labeled “IMPORTANT” (bolded),
followed by the correct answer they should respond with to a subsequent survey question
on the next screen asking which industry they most closely associated with northern
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Rhode Island. Participants were compensated $0.20 for completing this brief survey.
Potential participants who were not automatically screened out by the attention check
question then learned of the opportunity to earn an additional $2.50 if they participated in
the study, and an additional $1.00 if they passed two attention check questions in the
study. These payments meet or exceed the best practice norms for Amazon Mechanical
Turk for the amount of time required to complete the tasks (Downs, Holbrook, Sheng,
and Cranor 2010). Finally, the experimental instrument gathered time spent on the task
and in different parts of the task. The use of pre-screening, attention check questions, best
practice payment rates per hour, additional payment contingent on attention, and
gathering task time data are all recommended to ensure high-quality responses on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Downs et al. 2010). Out of the original 691 participants, only
434 passed the screening questions and decided to participate in the main study.
2.3.2 Experimental Design
My experiment employs a 2 × 3 × 2 between-subjects design. I manipulate the
primary investor base of the company (institutional investors vs. individual investors),
the overall interpretation of the AQIs (good vs. mixed vs. bad), and the level of
aggregation (more aggregated vs. more disaggregated). Participants were randomly
assigned to experimental conditions by the Qualtrics survey that I posted to the Amazon
Mechanical Turk website.
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2.3.3 Task and Manipulation
Participants read an adapted juror case study that has been extensively used in
prior research (e.g., Kadous 2000, Peecher and Piercey 2008).1 Similar to Peecher and
Piercey (2008) and the second study of my dissertation, I provided background
information that explained relevant accounting and legal terms (e.g. materiality,
misstatement, reasonable assurance, negligence) that might be unfamiliar to participants
but would be explained during a courtroom trial. The background information also
described the role and function of the auditor and what would happen if the auditor failed
to exercise due care. To encourage attention, the instructions told participants that the
task would include review questions to ensure that participants read and understood the
concepts covered.
Participants then read about a fictional company, Big Time Gravel that is audited
by Jones & Company. They learned that Big Time Gravel has highly customizable
machinery that is neither bought nor sold on the open market, and therefore does not have
a readily available market value. During the auditors’ test of asset impairment, they
assigned a reasonable valuation of the machinery between $450 and $550 million. Since
management of Big Time Gravel assigned a value of $545 million, they recorded a $10
million impairment loss in the financial statements, which Jones & Company had deemed
acceptable. Participants then learned that the company’s machinery has experienced
difficulty, triggering enormous losses for the Big Time Gravel and its investors.

1

The case was also reviewed for realism by four legal professionals with a combined 38 years of legal
experience, including a former law school dean and a clerk for one of district courts of the United States.
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At this point in the case, participants encountered my investor base manipulation.
In the individual (sophisticated) investor base condition, participants are informed that
85% of the company’s investor base is composed of individual (institutional) investors
including retirees, current and former employees, and other people saving money
(pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, and Wall Street investment companies that
manage at least 100 million). Participants are then informed that, compared to the other
type of investor, these individual (institutional) investors generally have less (more)
resources, have less (more) access to information about a company, and are often less
(more) highly educated about investments.
Participants are then informed that the investors have decided to sue Jones and
Company. They are provided information regarding the AQIs by an expert witness. In the
good (bad) AQI condition, the expert witness pointed out that all six of the highlighted
AQIs indicated higher (lower) audit quality than for the previous year. In the mixed AQI
condition, two AQIs indicated higher audit quality, two indicated lower audit quality, and
two indicated similar audit quality to the previous year. In all conditions, participants
were informed that were no significant changes to the operations or risks the Big Time
Gravel faced in the year of alleged misstatement compared to the prior year.
Participants then read that witnesses for the investors testified the true value of the
machinery should have been $495 million and that a $60 million impairment loss should
have been recorded instead of $10 million. If Big Time Gravel had recorded a $60
million impairment loss, operating income would be reduced by 1.3% and the company
would fail to meet analysts’ earnings target for the company, making the alleged
misstatement both quantitatively significant using conventional materiality cutoffs (e.g.,
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Hatfield, Houston, Stefaniak, and Usrey al. 2010) and qualitatively material (SEC 1999).
Investors allege that if the loss of $60 million was to have been recorded by the company,
they would have not remained invested in the company.
Finally, similarly to the second study of my dissertation, participants read an
excerpt from Big Time Gravel’s income statement, with columns showing the numbers as
reported in the audited financial statements, the numbers as the investors’ expert
witnesses testified that they should have been reported, and the difference between the
two as a dollar and percentage difference. In the more (less) aggregated financial
statement conditions, “Cost of goods sold” was reported as a single line-item (broken
down into nine separate line-items, including a separate line-item for the impairment loss
on the machinery) (cf. Libby and Emett 2014).
2.3.4 Response Variable and Post Experimental Questions
The primary dependent variable for this study is negligence, or participants’
ratings of how negligent the auditors were in failing to accurately assess the impairment
loss of Big Time Gravel’s Machinery. It is measured on a 10-point scale from “Not at all
negligent” to “Completely negligent”.
I also gathered a series of supplemental measures from participants. First, I asked
participants how material of an impact the misstatement would have on the judgment of a
reasonable person relying on the financial statements (materiality–overall), as well as
how material its impact was on the financial statement line-item that it appeared in
(materiality–line-item). I then asked participants to rate how much they could relate to the
investors in the case (investor relatability), how much they believed the investors were
significantly impacted by their losses (investor impact), and how much the investors
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relied on the financial statements for their investment in Big Time Gravel (investor
reliance). Additionally, I asked participants how vulnerable they believe the investors
were (investor vulnerability), followed by three questions designed to investigate why
participants might view individual investors as more vulnerable than institutional
investors, and which aspect of their different levels of vulnerability might play a role in
observed effects between my manipulations and the dependent variable. Specifically, I
asked them the extent to which they believe the investors in this case were vulnerable due
to the resources they had (investor vulnerability–resources), due to the access to
information that they had to evaluate Big Time Gravel (investor vulnerability–
information access), and due to their ability to evaluate Big Time Gravel’s financial
statements (investor vulnerability –ability). All of these post-experimental questions
were measured on 10-point scales.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Comprehension Check and Manipulation Checks
Of the 434 participants, 27 participants did not finish the study and were removed
from analysis. Participants answered four questions checking their understanding of
materiality, reasonable assurance, negligence, and other legal/auditing concepts. Their
accuracy ranged from 98.5 to 99% (401 to 403 out of 407) on the four questions,
indicating a high level of comprehension of the background information. Thus, the
participants appeared to have the same basic auditing and legal understanding a
reasonably attentive juror would have. To make sure participants paid attention to my
AQIs and investor base manipulations, I asked participants to identify the investor base of
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the company and the audit quality indicators. 399 participants correctly identified the
audit quality indicators of Big Time Gravel while 402 correctly identified the investor
base of the company.2
To check my aggregation manipulation, I use my materiality-line-item and
materiality-overall measures and find that participants perceived the alleged
misstatement to be more material to the line item (6.40 vs. 5.56, t=3.38, F=11.475,
p=.001) and more material to the financial statements as a whole (5.70 vs. 6.40, t=2.79,
F=7.819, p=.005) when the financial statements were disaggregated instead of
aggregated. Thus my manipulations appear to have been successful.
2.4.2 Hypothesis Tests
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for how
negligent participants believed Jones and Company were in performing the audit for Big
Time Gravel. The higher the rating, the more the participants believe the auditor will
likely be found negligent.

2

I drop participants who did not complete the study or failed the manipulation attention check questions
from further analysis resulting in a final sample of 396 participants. Results remain qualitatively unchanged
if I include or drop the participants who failed the review questions.
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Table 2.1
Negligence Judgments

Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Means for negligence judgments, standard deviations, and sample sizes by experimental
condition

AQIs
Good
Mean
st. dev. (n)
Mixed
Mean
st. dev. (n)
Bad
Mean
st. dev. (n)

Aggregated
Investor Base
Individual Institutional

Aggregation
Disaggregated
Investor Base
Individual Institutional

Overall
Investor Base
Individual Institutional

4.47
2.66 (36)

4.41
2.65 (32)

5.12
2.74 (33)

4.54
2.74 (35)

4.78
2.70 (69)

4.48
2.68 (67)

4.63
1.96 (32)

4.69
2.46 (35)

4.18
2.46 (33)

5.39
2.60 (33)

4.40
2.22 (65)

5.03
2.53 (68)

5.29
2.67 (35)

6.22
2.18 (32)

5.80
2.34 (30)

5.93
2.30 (30)

5.52
2.52 (65)

6.08
2.23 (62)

Panel B: Analysis of variance for negligence judgments
Sum of
Source
Squares
df
Investor base
7.87
1
AQIs
110.55
2
Aggregation
4.49
1
Investor base × AQIs
18.55
2
Investor base × aggregation
0.07
1
AQIs × aggregation
1.62
2
Three-way interaction
18.24
2
Error
2486.00
384
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Mean
Square
7.87
55.27
4.49
9.27
0.07
0.81
9.12
6.24

F
p
1.26
0.262
8.86 < 0.001
0.72
0.397
1.49
0.228
0.01
0.915
0.13
0.878
1.46
0.233

H1 predicted that disaggregating the financial statements will lead to a greater
increase in jurors’ negligence judgments for individual investors than for institutional
investors. However, there is no significant Aggregation × Investor base interaction (pvalue= 0.915), thus H1 is not supported. H2 asserted that the difference between jurors’
negligence assessments for good, mixed, and bad AQIs will be greater when the financial
statements are aggregated than when they are disaggregated. Unfortunately, there was no
significant AQI × Aggregation interaction (p-value=0.878), thus H2 is not supported. H3
suggests that negative (positive) AQIs will increase (decrease) jurors’ judgments of
auditor negligence more when the company’s investor base consists primarily of
individual investors than when it consists primarily of institutional investors, however
there is no significant AQI × Investor base (p=0.228), thus H3 is not supported. Finally,
H4 predicts the interaction found in H3to be stronger when the financial statements are
aggregated. Unfortunately, there is no significant three way interaction (p-value=0.233),
thus H4 is not supported.
The only significant effect on participant's assessments of auditor negligence
appear to be a main effect of the audit quality indicators (p<.001). Jurors believed the
auditor would be more likely to be found negligent when the audit quality indicators were
bad as opposed to good (5.80 vs. 4.63, t=3.80, F=14.46, p<.001) or mixed (5.80 vs. 4.72,
t=3.51, F=12.29, p=.001). They did not, however, feel the auditor would be more likely
to be found negligent when the audit indicators were good as when they were mixed
(4.63 vs. 4.72, t=0.28, F=0.08, p=.778). Thus, auditors are only held to be more negligent
when the audit quality indicators indicate a poor audit was performed by the auditor.
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2.5 Conclusion
I conducted an experiment to examine the joint influence of AQIs, financial
statement aggregation, and investor base, or jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence. My
findings could provide insight for standard setters about consequences of mandatory AQI
disclosure in a litigation setting. While practitioners have expressed concerns about AQIs
generally increasing their risk of litigation, my results suggest that this is only a concern
when the AQIs indicate a poorly performed audit.
Like all empirical research, this study has limitations. There are a number of
different factors that relate to the task, decision-maker, and legal environmental that I do
not examine that could impact my findings. For example, future research could examine
different AQIs, or examine their disclosure or lack of disclosure under different
regulatory conditions. These or other facets of the task and environment could be fruitful
avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT AGGREGATION, ESTIMATE
UNCERTAINTY, AND MISSTATEMENT SIZE ON JUROR JUDGMENTS
3.1 Introduction
In the United States, accounting standards require very little disaggregation of the
income statement. As Libby and Emett (2014) point out, U.S. standards only require that
operating expenses be broken into (1) cost of sales and (2) a single line-item for selling,
general, and administrative expenses on the income statement, and (while some
companies disaggregate these amounts considerably) many report them in this minimal
way. Further, U.S. standards provide little guidance as to which expenses fall into each of
these categories, and, without guidance, companies vary considerably in what they do
and do not include within each of these line-items, even within the same industry (Libby
& Emett, 2014). In contrast to the U.S., international accounting standards generally
require more disaggregation of the income statement, although those rules allow
companies significant discretion as well (IASB, 2009; Libby & Brown, 2013; SEC,
2011). Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015) demonstrate archivally that there is a wide
variance in the level of line-item aggregation or disaggregation in practice, and that more
aggregation leads to larger analyst forecast errors. Libby and Brown (2013) demonstrate
that auditors are less likely to correct misstatements when they are aggregated with other
accounts into a single income statement line-item. Further, they show that there is little
agreement among auditors about whether the aggregation or disaggregation of line-items
matters to them, or about what professional standards require. Thus, managers could
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potentially use aggregation to manipulate the appearance of a company in audited
financial statements.
If auditors are less likely to correct misstatements that occur in aggregated income
statement accounts (Libby & Brown, 2013), then aggregation potentially increases the
risk of materially misstated financial statements with a clean audit opinion. In this paper,
we investigate whether aggregation could simultaneously help protect auditors from
exposure to the legal risks of uncorrected material misstatements. If so, then the lack of
clear guidance in accounting and auditing standards on aggregation or disaggregation in
income statements may ultimately allow more misstatements in audited financial
statements while (ironically) also helping provide a critical gatekeeper (the auditor) with
shelter from the legal costs of more misstatements in audited financial statements.
Although this would be contrary to the normal intent of standard setters, U.S. standards
are mostly silent on the issue of aggregation, and the few opinions that its standard setting
body has offered on aggregation have been both positive and negative (e.g., FASB, 1979,
1984; Libby & Emett, 2014).
I investigate the effect of income statement aggregation on jurors’ assessments of
auditors following an uncorrected material misstatement in the financial statements that
resulted in losses incurred by plaintiffs. I examine this in settings of uncorrected material
misstatements related to accounting estimates of either high or low estimate uncertainty.
Research has expressed concerns over high levels of estimate uncertainty unfairly
increasing auditors’ litigation risks, especially when the amount of estimate uncertainty
exceeds the size of alleged material misstatements (e.g., Christensen, Glover, & Wood,
2012; Bell & Griffin, 2012). Using prior research and theory, I predict that the
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combination of a material misstatement in a disaggregated income statement and low
estimate uncertainty will lead jurors to increase the standard of care that they mentally
hold auditors to for (failing to) detect and correct the material misstatement. This increase
in the standard of care that auditors are held to, in turn, increases jurors’ assessments of
the negligence of the auditors during their performance of the audit. An implication of
my findings is that, by standard setters allowing a wide variance in the level of income
statement aggregation in practice (Libby & Brown, 2013), higher levels of income
statement aggregation can allow auditors to avoid legal exposure for failing to detect
misstatements of low estimate uncertainty.
Using an experiment, I find evidence supportive of my theory and hypotheses.
Specifically, participants in the role of jurors read an experimental case of materially
misstated financial statements that carried a clean audit opinion, and I manipulated the
presentation of the income statement (more aggregated or more disaggregated) and the
level of estimate uncertainty related to the misstatement (higher or lower). While the
misstatement is material in all experimental conditions, I also manipulate the size of the
material misstatement, to test my predictions under both conditions in which the range of
estimate uncertainty is both smaller than and larger than the alleged material
misstatement (Christensen et al., 2012). My findings suggest that the joint effect of
aggregation and estimate uncertainty on jurors’ standard of care judgments and on their
negligence judgments occur across both types of scenarios.
My findings have implications for the small but growing literature on financial
statement line-item aggregation and disaggregation. For example, prior research suggests
negative effects of aggregation on auditors’ judgments (Libby & Brown, 2013), both
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negative and positive effects on investors’ judgments (Elliott, Hobson, & White, 2015),
and no effects of aggregation on experienced credit analysts’ judgments (Bloomfield,
Hodge, Hopkins, & Rennekamp, 2015). My study examines the issue within an auditor
litigation context and suggests that allowing aggregation may help shelter auditors from
legal exposure due to uncorrected misstatements with inherently lower estimate
uncertainty.
My findings also have implications for the auditing literature on estimate
uncertainty. Prior auditing research has expressed significant concern that requiring
auditors to express an opinion on accounting estimates with wide-ranging estimate
uncertainty potentially opens up auditors to unacceptably high litigation risks (e.g.,
Christensen et al., 2012; Bell & Griffin, 2012). In contrast, my study suggests that high
estimate uncertainty may have the opposite effect on litigation risks under certain
conditions. Specifically, jurors appear to recognize that auditors have less ability to
accurately make valuations of inherently high estimate uncertainty. Furthermore, while
jurors recognize that auditors should have more ability to detect low-uncertainty
misstatements, they nevertheless hold auditors to a lower standard of care when the
income statement is aggregated. Thus, once auditors are in litigation due to an undetected
misstatement, high estimate uncertainty can potentially decrease (rather than increase)
their litigation risks under common conditions.
My findings also have implications for the literature on auditor negligence
litigation. Across all of my experimental conditions, participants in my study believed
that auditors had a uniformly high obligation to correct the material misstatement. Yet,
whether they held auditors responsible for failing to do so depended on the joint effects
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of aggregation and estimate uncertainty. This suggests a disconnect between jurors’
perceptions of auditors obligations and the extent to which they hold auditors responsible
for failing to meet those obligations.
Finally, these findings should be informative to standard setters. That is, standard
setters have viewed income statement line-item aggregation as a generally harmless
choice or, in some ways, even benign (Libby & Emett, 2014; Libby & Brown, 2013).
Yet, aggregation may result in both an increased likelihood of uncorrected misstatements
in audited financial statements and simultaneously reduced legal implications for some of
those uncorrected material misstatements. Thus, standard setters’ current guidance level
may carry spillover effects that they do not intend.
3.2 Hypotheses Development
3.2.1 Financial Statement Aggregation and Disaggregation
Nearly all research on the aggregation or disaggregation of accounting
information uses archival methods to focus on the level of disaggregation into different
operating segments (i.e., “segment reporting”) in the financial statements, as opposed to
the disaggregation of financial statement line-items (see Libby & Emett, 2014, for a
review).3 However, recent archival work by Chen et al. (2015) focuses on line-item
aggregation by examining its variance among U.S.-listed public companies by counting
the number of non-missing items from financial statement subtotals in the Compustat
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When firms disaggregate accounting information into fewer reporting segments, their reporting decision
can be driven by a desire to present themselves opportunistically by burying segment losses or by a
reluctance to reveal proprietary information about a profitable segment to competitors (e.g., Bens, Berger &
Monahan, 2011; Berger & Hann, 2007; Botosan & Stanford, 2005). Users of financial statements generally
benefit from more disaggregation into segment-level information (e.g., Berger & Hann, 2003; Ettredge,
Kwon, Smith, & Zarowin, 2005). However, regulatory requirements that increase the level of this
disaggregation may also at least temporarily increase overall uncertainty for analysts (Botosan & Stanford,
2005).
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database. Consistent with Libby and Emett’s (2014) review, Chen et al. (2015) find wide
variance in the level of line-item aggregation or disaggregation in practice. Furthermore,
they find that aggregation in audited financial statements is correlated with larger analyst
forecast errors and other indicators of lower transparency.
Experimental research has focused on the level of disaggregation of financial
statement line-items. The existing body of research is small and presents mixed findings
about whether and how aggregation or disaggregation of financial statement line-items
influences users’ judgments. Libby and Brown (2013) show that auditors are less likely to
correct misstatements when they are aggregated with other accounts into a single income
statement line-item, suggesting that aggregation can lead to more material misstatements
propagating into audited financial statements. In contrast, Bloomfield et al. (2015) do not
find systematic effects of aggregation or disaggregation on the judgments of credit
analysts. In that study, analysts were asked to analyze the financial statements of two
companies and provide creditworthiness judgments. Information about relevant operating
risks of the companies, however, were placed in two income statement accounts that
either were or were not aggregated. When participants received financial statements
disaggregating the relevant information, analysts’ ability to identify relevant operating
risks depended on the location of the disaggregated information in the financial
statements and the format of the financial statements. However, for the participants who
received aggregated financial statements, their judgments were not systematically
different from any of the participants who received disaggregated information, regardless
of where it was presented or how the financial statements were formatted. Thus,
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Bloomfield et al. (2015) caution standard setters that aggregation or disaggregation may
not incrementally influence users’ judgments.
Elliott et al. (2015) examine a laboratory market’s processing of earnings
information that is either aggregated, disaggregated into persistent earnings components
versus non-persistent earnings events, or consisting of persistent components only. While
disaggregation generally improved market efficiency, long investors were more likely to
erroneously interpret the disaggregated, non-persistent earnings events as evidence of
persistent good news. Thus, the benefits of disaggregation may depend on the type of
investor and their ability to incorporate the information into their judgments in a nonbiased manner. Finally, Bonner, Clor-Proell, and Koonce (2014) similarly suggest that
the benefits or drawbacks of aggregation may depend on other factors. Using MBA
students in the role of managers and in the role of investors, Bonner et al. (2014) provide
evidence that managers aggregate losses and disaggregate gains in order to present the
company in as favorable a light as possible, and that these aggregation and disaggregation
presentation tactics, in turn, influence investors’ impressions of the company. Thus,
whether investors would benefit most from aggregation or disaggregation depends on the
nature of the gain or loss.
Overall, prior research suggests that whether and when financial statement users
benefit from line-item disaggregation may depend on a variety of factors related to the
task, judgment environment, and the decision maker. As Libby and Emett (2014) note,
the research to date is small, and further research is warranted. While existing research
suggests that line-item aggregation may increase the likelihood of the auditor allowing
uncorrected misstatements into the financial statements (Libby & Brown, 2013), I focus
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on the implications of aggregation on auditor’s responsibility for uncorrected
misstatements. Next, I develop theory that juror judgments depend jointly on financial
statement aggregation and estimate uncertainty.
3.3.2 Estimate Uncertainty
Auditors are increasingly responsible to form opinions about valuation estimates
for illiquid assets and liabilities for which observable market prices are unavailable and
estimation techniques are fraught with uncertainty (e.g., Griffin, 2014). Recent research
has focused on the difficulties that high levels of estimate uncertainty place on the audit
profession. Auditors may not have the expertise to understand many complex estimates,
and they may evaluate complex estimates using approaches more appropriate for
verifying objective transactions (Griffith, Hammersly, & Kadous, 2015a). Improving the
audit of complex estimates may require fundamental adjustments to the overall audit
approach (Bell & Griffin, 2012; Griffith, Hammersly, Kadous & Young, 2015b). Of
particular concern, some estimates come with ranges of uncertainty so large that they
exceed materiality thresholds, and market participants may not recognize the especially
difficult position that this places auditors in for undetected material misstatements that
are within the range of estimate uncertainty (Christensen et al., 2012). As a result,
researchers have expressed concern that high levels of estimate uncertainty may increase
auditors’ litigation risk onerously, despite the level of uncertainty potentially being
beyond the auditors’ ability to fully control (e.g., Christensen et al., 2012; Bell & Griffin,
2012).
While high levels of estimate uncertainty may increase the inherent risk of
material misstatement in the financial statements (e.g., Griffith et al., 2015a), Griffin
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(2014) finds that auditors generally respond to higher inherent uncertainty in
management’s estimate by requiring more audit adjustments. Thus, the net effect of
estimate uncertainty on actual auditor litigation is unclear. Recent archival evidence on
estimate uncertainty and audit fees suggest that auditors price the audit under a belief that
higher levels of estimate uncertainty overall tends to increase their litigation risks
(Goncharov, Reidl, & Sellhorn, 2014). Furthermore, archival evidence suggests that
higher estimate uncertainty strains the auditor-client relationship across a variety of
measures, presumably reflecting a belief by auditors that estimate uncertainty increases
their legal risks (Ayers, Neal, Reid, & Shipman, 2014). Thus, auditors appear to believe
that high estimate uncertainty increases their own litigation risks by more than the effects
of any offsetting changes to the audit approach that the uncertainty may prompt.
3.2.3 Estimate Uncertainty, Income Statement Aggregation, and the Standard of
Care
While high estimate uncertainty may ultimately increase the probability of
auditors entering into litigation, it remains an open question how high levels of estimate
uncertainty will influence jurors’ judgments of auditors once they are in litigation. In this
section, I use prior research and theory to predict that high estimate uncertainty can
actually decrease (rather than increase) auditors’ litigation risks, depending on whether or
not the misstatement is aggregated with other accounts in its income statement line-item,
by affecting the standard of care that jurors hold auditors to.
The standard of care that jurors hold auditors to is an important factor in jurors’
negligence judgments (Kadous, 2000; Maksymov & Nelson, 2014). It represents jurors’
mental representations of the level of work and care that a properly conducted audit
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would have engaged in to detect material misstatements (Kadous, 2000). As Peecher and
Piercey (2008) note, jurors are relative novices with auditing and accounting contexts and
are at a tremendous disadvantage understanding and interpreting the ex ante sufficiency
of specific aspects of audit work (e.g., appropriate sample sizes or hours budgeted to a
task). As a result, jurors are unlikely to spontaneously form precise expectations about
the quantity or nature of audit specific procedures that auditors should have performed ex
ante to achieve a specific audit objective. Rather, jurors are more likely to form a more
vague mental representation (cf. Wallsten, 1990) of whether a properly conducted audit
would have prevented the material misstatement under the specific conditions of the case
(cf. Kinney & Nelson, 1996; Kadous, 2000). The more that jurors believe that a properly
conducted audit would have detected the material misstatement in a particular setting, the
higher of a standard they are to holding auditors to for failing to do so. Thus, based on
prior theory and research, I describe this vague mental representation of what a properly
conducted audit would have done as juror’s standard of care.
Peecher and Piercey (2008) suggest that jurors, lacking complete information and
expertise to interpret the sufficiency of ex ante audit work on their own, will search for
other cues to help them assess auditors. Specifically, jurors will attempt to interpret the
incomplete information they have about the ex ante work done at the time of the audit by
using attributes of the ex post material misstatement observed (Kadous, 2000; Peecher &
Piercey, 2008).
Aggregation or disaggregation is likely to be one such attribute of a material
misstatement affecting jurors’ judgments. Holding the size of a material misstatement and
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its other qualitative factors4 constant, a misstatement is likely to appear more salient
when it appears on the income statement in its own account as a single line-item. In
contrast, when the misstated account is aggregated with other (non-misstated) accounts
into a single line-item, the impact of the misstatement should be diluted in the minds of
jurors. As a result of this dilution effect (cf. Fanning, Agoglia, & Piercey, 2015), I expect
that, ceteris paribus, a material misstatement will appear to jurors to have a larger
(smaller) impact on the financial statements when its account is disaggregated from
(aggregated with) other accounts in its income statement line-item.
Thus, disaggregation of a material misstatement makes it appear more salient.
However, as I discuss next, the impact of disaggregation on jurors’ judgments of auditors
likely depends on the level of inherent estimate uncertainty surrounding the misstatement.
There are at least two possible viewpoints for predicting how jurors will react to
high levels of estimate uncertainty. Under one view, jurors learning that there was high
estimate uncertainty surrounding an undetected misstatement will hold the auditor more
culpable for not being more careful and expressing an incorrect audit opinion when there
was high estimate uncertainty. This viewpoint would not expect jurors to recognize that
estimate uncertainty is driven by environmental and chance factors beyond the auditor’s
control, and that lower levels of estimate uncertainty (not higher levels) imply that the
auditor was remiss in failing to detect it. This is a somewhat naïve model of juror
judgment because it assumes that jurors will react negatively to estimate uncertainty out
of a generalized dislike of uncertainty and ambiguity, regardless of the source of the

4

Other qualitative factors affecting the materiality of a misstatement include whether the misstatement is
necessary to meet earnings benchmarks or analysts’ expectations (SEC, 1999).
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uncertainty, and that jurors are unable to make attributions of a failure to alternative
causes.
In contrast to this viewpoint, jurors do not necessarily attribute the causes of
failures to factors within the defendant’s control, and recognize the presence and role of
uncertainty in making these attributions (Curley, 2007), consistent with psychology’s
generalized characterizations of individuals as boundedly rational. According to
Attribution Theory, individuals placed into the position of evaluating performance after
an observed failure (e.g., a material misstatement) attempt to attribute the failure to
internal causes, relational causes, or external causes, searching for appropriate cues
(Eberly et al., 2011; Burton et al., 2014). In my setting, internal causes of an undetected
material misstatement would be the result of factors within the auditor’s control (e.g.,
insufficient audit effort), relational causes arise from interactions between the auditor and
management (e.g., auditor independence problems), and external causes would be the
result of factors not controllable by auditors. Furthermore, to the extent that individuals
are unable to clearly attribute the cause of a failure to internal causes, relational causes, or
external causes, they tend not to attribute the cause anywhere, instead holding “belief in
reserve” (e.g., Shafer, 1976; Macchi, Osherson & Krantz, 1999). This behavior has been
demonstrated among jurors (Curley, 2007).
When evaluating the performance of auditors following an undetected material
misstatement, jurors are likely to form vague representations of what the auditors should
have been able to do to prevent the material misstatement had they conducted the audit
properly (i.e., standard of care). Disaggregating a material misstatement (holding its size
constant) will generally make it appear more glaring and give jurors a stronger sense that
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the error negatively impacts the financial statements. However, in the process of
determining whether a properly conducted audit should have been able to uncover the
misstatement, jurors will search for cues that allow them to attribute the failure to
internal, external, or relational causes. Although high levels of estimate uncertainty may
indeed increase the auditors’ risk of being brought into litigation due to undetected
misstatements (Bell & Griffin, 2012; Christensen et al., 2012), once in court, high
estimate uncertainty provides a means for jurors to attribute the failure to causes external
to the auditors. Furthermore, to the extent that high estimate uncertainty makes jurors
uncertain as to where to assign their attributions, they are likely to retain more belief in
reserve (Schafer, 1976). Either way, higher external attributions or belief in reserve make
jurors less likely to attribute the cause of the misstatement to factors directly within the
auditors’ control (e.g., internal or relational causes).
In contrast, when the misstatement is related to an estimate of low inherent
uncertainty, the jurors are unable to find external explanations for attributing the failure
and feel more comfortable unambiguously assigning blame to auditors. Thus, a
disaggregated misstatement may appear so glaring that on the surface it appears that the
auditors should have been able to prevent it; however, jurors are less likely to determine
that the auditors should have been able to prevent it when its related inherent estimate
uncertainty is high. The less jurors believe that a properly conducted audit would have
been able to prevent a material misstatement, the lower the standard of care they are
effectively holding auditors to for failing to correct the misstatement.
This leads to the following expectations. First, when a material misstatement is
disaggregated from other accounts in its own line item and stems from an estimate of
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inherently low uncertainty, jurors will hold auditors to a relatively high standard of care.
In contrast, if the disaggregated misstatement stems from inherently high estimate
uncertainty, jurors will hold auditors to a relatively lower standard of care, since the high
estimate uncertainty provides an external source of uncertainty to attribute the accounting
failure towards. When material misstatements are aggregated with other non-misstated
accounts into one line-item, jurors will hold auditors to a relatively lower standard of
care, since that has the effect of making the material misstatement less salient and less
impactful. High or low estimate uncertainty will be less likely to incrementally impact
aggregated misstatements, since those misstatements appear less salient, reducing the
jurors’ need to search for other external attributions for the misstatement. This suggests
the following ordinal interaction of disaggregation of a material misstatement and
estimate uncertainty on jurors’ standard of care:
H1: Jurors will hold auditors to a relatively high standard of care for a
disaggregated material misstatement of lower estimate uncertainty, and
jurors will hold auditors to a relatively lower standard of care when the
material misstatement is aggregated with other financial statement lineitems, when estimate uncertainty is high, or both.
An important implication of these predictions is that auditors will face a relatively
lower standard of care from jurors for failing to detect a material misstatement in the
financial statements when it is more aggregated with other financial statement accounts.
Thus, income statement aggregation can both make auditors less likely to correct
misstatements (Libby & Brown, 2013), and yet simultaneously provide them shelter from
litigation risk for failing to do so when estimate uncertainty is low.
As stated previously, jurors are likely to form a vague mental representation of
what a properly conducted audit should have been able to do (i.e., standard of care) in an
attempt to help them assess auditor negligence. Jurors’ standard of care judgments are
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likely to impact their negligence judgments (Kadous, 2000). That is, jurors attempt to
compare what should have happened to what did happen, and the more that a properly
conducted audit should have prevented a material misstatement (i.e., the higher the
standard of care), the more jurors will hold auditors negligent for failing to detect the
misstatement. Thus, I expect that the interactive effect of aggregation and estimate
uncertainty predicted for jurors’ standard of care for auditors in H1 will, in turn, also
influence jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence. Stated formally:
H2: The joint effect of disaggregation and low estimate uncertainty on jurors’
standard of care (H1) will, in turn, influence jurors’ judgments of auditor
negligence in the same direction.

3.3. Method
3.3.1 Participants
Following prior research (e.g., Grenier, Pomeroy, & Stern, 2014; Grenier,
Pomeroy, & Reffett, 2012; Kadous & Mercer, 2012; Peecher & Piercey, 2008), we
recruited undergraduate students enrolled in a very large sophomore-level introductory
accounting course as participants in my study. Meta-analyses of prior research on jurors
indicate that undergraduates’ judgments are similar to those of jurors across different task
factors and contexts (Bornstein, 1999; Zickafoose & Bornstein, 1999). This similarity in
the judgments of undergraduates and broader pools of juror-eligible adults has been
replicated in accounting studies on auditor negligence litigation (e.g., Cornell, Warne, &
Eining, 2009; Grenier et al., 2014; Kadous, 2001).5 Students in introductory accounting
generally have enough basic understanding of financial statements and their purpose to
understand the task, similar to the basic understanding that jurors would receive during an
5

Under these conditions, Libby et al. (2002), Peecher and Solomon (2001), Kadous and Mercer (2012), and
Bonner et al. (2014) suggest that students are appropriate participants.
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extended trial, and yet they are still relative novices and have no experience making audit
decisions, also similar to jurors (Kadous & Mercer, 2012; Peecher & Piercey, 2008). 6
My sample consists of 433 participants, 44.5 percent of whom were female.
Participants received extra course credit for putting in a reasonable amount of effort. On
average, participants had completed 2.48 years of post-high school education, 1.68
accounting classes, and 4.11 management, accounting, and/or economics college courses.
3.3.2 Experimental Design
My experiment uses a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. My three
manipulated experimental factors are: (1) the aggregation of the income statement
numbers (more aggregated vs. more disaggregated), (2) the level of subjective estimate
uncertainty involved in the accounting loss that yielded the alleged material misstatement
(high vs. low), and (3) the alleged misstatement size (larger vs. smaller). The
misstatement size manipulation allows us to test H1 and H2 in conditions when the
material misstatement is outside the range of uncertainty as well as when it is within the
range of uncertainty, since the latter scenario has been of particular interest to accounting
research and others concerned about auditor liability (e.g., Christensen et al., 2012; Bell
& Griffin, 2012). This manipulation allows us to test the robustness of my predictions for
both settings (e.g., Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercey, 2015). I delivered the experimental
instrument to participants online, using Qualtrics® software, which randomly assigned
them to experimental conditions.

6

Using a large introductory accounting class also gives us a sample that spans 29 undergraduate majors.
Nineteen percent of the participants indicated that they intend to major in accounting. An intention to major
in accounting has no significant effects on my results (cf. Peecher and Solomon 2001; Libby et al. 2002).
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3.3.3 Task and Manipulations
Participants read a legal case as jurors. I designed my experimental materials
based on instruments from prior research (Kadous, 2000, 2001; Peecher & Piercey,
2008), adapted and customized for my hypotheses, manipulations, and measures of
interest. My experimental materials were reviewed by four lawyers who had a combined
38 years of legal experience (including a former law school dean and a United States
District Court clerk), in order to ensure that the information presented would be both
realistic and admissible in court.
The case materials began by giving participants a basic understanding of the
auditing concepts (e.g., audit opinions and reasonable assurance) similar to that which
jurors would receive during a trial, adapted from Peecher and Piercey (2008).7 The case
then proceeded with details about the audit of a gravel and cement company, Big Time
Gravel, performed by the accounting firm Jones & Company, adapted from Kadous
(2000, 2001). Before my manipulations of estimate uncertainty and misstatement size, the
case first described how the company’s mining machinery is a critical portion of the
company, and how the company must recognize an “impairment loss” (which reduces
reported earnings) if the market value of the machinery is substantially less than what is
stated on the company’s books. Furthermore, Big Time Gravel’s mining machinery is
extremely customized to their mines, quarries, and processing sites, and therefore is not
regularly bought and sold on an open market, and so does not have readily available

7

Specifically, following Peecher and Piercey (2008), the beginning of the instrument (1) advised
participants that they would be asked review questions about case material (to encourage attention), (2)
explained fundamental auditing concepts (such as material misstatements, materiality, “clean” audit
opinions, reasonable assurance versus absolute assurance, negligence, audit procedures, and the
consequences of undetected material misstatements), and (3) asked related review questions, with the
opportunity for participants to look back at what they read.
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market prices. Instead, Big Time Gravel uses a mathematical model to estimate the fair
value of the machinery.
In the high (low) estimate uncertainty conditions, the case told participants that
the model is based on highly subjective (objective) and very complicated
(straightforward) assumptions about the cash that the machinery will generate, as well as
other difficult (simple) projections about the rather unpredictable (predictable) future
costs of operating the machinery. In all conditions, the company recorded the value of the
machinery at $545 million, resulting in a $10 million impairment loss. However, in the
high (low) estimate uncertainty conditions, because of the high (low) levels of
uncertainty in these inputs, the auditors believe the value of the machinery to be
somewhere between $350 million and $650 million ($450 million and $550 million).
This manipulation holds the midpoint of the auditor’s estimate range constant at $500
million, and simply varies the width of the range. In all conditions, the company’s value
of the machinery of $545 million is within the auditor’s reasonable estimate range, and so
Jones & Company concluded that the account was not materially misstated, without
requiring adjustment.
Next, all participants read about an alleged misstatement in the value of the
machinery and a subsequent lawsuit. After audited financial statements (with the
auditors’ clean opinion) were issued, the company’s mining machinery encountered
problems, which created high costs of both repair and lost revenue while the machinery
was down. Investors sued Big Time Gravel, alleging that the condition of the machinery
should have been apparent to the auditors during the audit of the financial statements. In
the larger (smaller) misstatement size conditions, expert witnesses testified that the true
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value of the machinery should have been $255 million ($495 million), reflecting an
overstatement in the value of the machinery by $290 million ($50 million), and an
understatement of the impairment loss by the same amount. While this manipulation
varies the magnitude of the material misstatements, in both conditions, the misstatements
are material. Specifically, both misstatements exceed 0.5% of sales, a common
quantitative materiality benchmark used in practice (Eilifsen & Messier, 2015; Ayers et
al. 2015), and the case informed all participants that the alleged misstatement allowed
Big Time Gravel to meet (rather than miss) analysts’ earnings targets of $1.28 per share,
a situation which always makes a misstatement material (SEC, 1999).
For my misstatement size manipulation, I chose a relatively strong manipulation
of large versus small misstatements for the following reasons. First, the purpose of this
manipulation is to test the robustness of my hypothesized effects under conditions of both
larger and smaller material misstatements. As a robustness test, I wanted a strong
manipulation that would maximize systematic differences between the two conditions, so
as to increase the chances of detecting any systematic differences in my hypothesized
effects within larger and smaller misstatement conditions, if any such differences occur
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Second, I wanted the larger (smaller) misstatement to be
completely outside (inside) of the auditor’s estimate range for all participants, regardless
of whether they were in the high or low estimate uncertainty conditions. This allows a
cleaner test of the effects of misstatement size, without making a particular misstatement
size outside of the auditor’s range in one level of estimate uncertainty and inside the
auditors range in the other level of estimate uncertainty. Thus, the implications of the
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misstatement being either inside or outside of the auditor’s range of uncertainty are held
constant within each level of misstatement size.
In all conditions, the plaintiffs allege that, without the misstatement causing the
company to meet analysts’ earnings targets, they would not have remained invested in the
company and therefore would not have incurred their subsequent losses. Participants then
received an excerpt from Big Time Gravel’s income statement, with columns showing
the numbers as reported in the audited financial statements, the numbers as the investors’
expert witnesses testified that they should have been reported, and the size of the alleged
misstatements, in both absolute and percentage terms. The financial statements were
manipulated so that the materially misstated account (impairment loss on machinery)
either appeared as its own line-item, or was aggregated with other accounts as a single
line-item. I designed my disaggregated condition following the disaggregated income
statement in FASB (2010, 118) closely, with only minimal adaptations to my study.
Appendix A shows examples of the aggregated and disaggregated conditions.
3.3.4 Dependent Variables
After reviewing the financial statements, participants made several judgments
related to the Jones & Company audit of Big Time Gravel. The primary dependent
variable for testing my theory is the standard of care that jurors hold the Jones &
Company auditors to. That is, the more that jurors believe a properly conducted audit
could have prevented a material misstatement, the higher of a standard they are holding
the Jones & Company audit to for detecting (or, in this case, not detecting) the
misstatement. Accordingly, I measure participants’ perceptions that a properly conducted
audit could have correctly valued the machinery and its related impairment loss on a scale
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from 1 to 10, and label this dependent variable as jurors’ standard of care for Jones &
Company. H1 predicts that aggregation and estimate uncertainty will jointly influence
jurors’ standard for what a properly conducted audit could have detected.
The secondary dependent variable for testing my theory is my participants’
perceptions of auditor negligence. My theory suggests that jurors will judge Jones &
Company’s negligence based on how their audit (which failed to detect the misstatement)
compares to the standard of care they hold Jones & Company to (i.e., the extent to which
a properly conducted audit could have detected it). I measure participants’ perceptions
that Jones & Company was negligent in failing to accurately assess the impairment loss
on a scale from 1 to 10. Finally, I gathered additional supplementary measures and
manipulation checks, as well as demographic data.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Comprehension and Manipulation Checks
Participants responded to five questions that tested their understanding of the
definitions of materiality, clean audit opinions, reasonable (vs. absolute) assurance, as
well as implications of negligence and undetected misstatements. Performance on
individual test items ranged from 96.1% (414 correct out of 431) to 99.5% (429 correct
out of 431), significantly greater than chance (all p’s < 0.001). Thus, the instrument
appeared to be successful in giving participants an understanding of new auditing
concepts at a level comparable to reasonably attentive jurors.
To check my manipulation of estimate uncertainty, my post-experimental
questionnaire asked participants to rate the level of estimate uncertainty surrounding the
inputs, assumptions, and estimation of the valuation model used by Big Time Gravel to
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estimate the fair market value of the machinery (perceived uncertainty), on a scale from 1
to 10. Participants’ perceived uncertainty ratings were significantly higher in the high
estimate uncertainty conditions than in the low estimate uncertainty conditions (7.33 vs.
6.66, t = 3.41, p < 0.001). In addition, I measured participants’ perceptions of the
auditors’ ability to correctly estimate the value of the machinery and its impairment loss
(perceived estimate ability, again on a scale from 1 to 10), since auditors should be less
able to estimate correctly given high estimate uncertainty. Participants’ perceived
estimate ability ratings were significantly lower in the high estimate uncertainty
conditions than in the low estimate uncertainty conditions (5.42 vs. 5.83, t = −2.11, p =
0.018). My manipulation of estimate uncertainty appears to be successful.
To check my manipulation of misstatement size, I gathered three measures of the
materiality of the alleged misstatement, expecting that participants would perceive the
misstatement to have a more material impact when the misstatement was larger than
when it was smaller. Specifically, participants assessed how much the alleged
misstatement would impact the judgment and decision making of a reasonable person
relying on the financial statements (materiality—judgment), how much the alleged
misstatement impacts its income statement line-item (materiality—line-item), and how
much it impacts the financial statements as a whole (materiality—fs-whole), on scales
from 1 to 10. Participants’ ratings of materiality—judgment, materiality—line-item, and
materiality—fs-whole were each significantly higher in the larger misstatement
conditions than in the lower misstatement conditions (7.37 vs. 6.17, t = 5.95, p < 0.001;
7.32 vs. 6.70; t = 3.71, p < 0.001; and 7.09 vs. 6.04, t = 5.52, p < 0.001; respectively).
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I also included the materiality measures to serve as a check of my aggregation
manipulation, and, in particular, materiality—line-item. Specifically, holding the size of
the misstatement constant, I would expect participants to find that the misstatement has a
larger impact on its income statement line-item when the misstated account appears by
itself on the income statement than when it is aggregated with other accounts into one
line-item. Furthermore, I would expect participants to believe that this impact on the
financial statement line-item (materiality—line-item) would, in turn, impact the financial
statements as a whole (materiality—fs-whole), as well as the judgment of a reasonable
person relying on those financial statements (materiality—judgment). My findings are
supportive of my manipulations. Besides the main effect of misstatement size, the only
other statistically significant effect on my three materiality measures is a main effect of
aggregation. Specifically, participants judged the impact of a misstatement to be larger
when the misstated account was by itself as a line-item than when it was aggregated with
other accounts. Participants’ ratings of materiality—line-item, materiality—fs-whole, and
materiality—judgment were all significantly lower in the aggregated conditions than in
the disaggregated conditions (6.38 vs. 7.34, t = 3.95, p < 0.001; 6.35 vs. 6.79, t = 2.31, p
= 0.011; and 6.42 vs. 7.11, t = 3.40, p < 0.001; respectively). Moreover, in untabulated
mediation analyses, I find that the effect of aggregation on materiality—line-item fully
mediates the effect of aggregation on materiality—judgment and materiality—fs-whole.8
Thus, overall, manipulation checks are consistent with misstatement size directly
influencing all three materiality measures, and aggregation influencing perceptions of
8

I obtain statistically similar findings for mediation tests based on structural equation modeling, regression
approaches, bootstrapping procedures, the Goodman test, the Sobel test, the Aroian test, or the traditional
Baron-and-Kenny causal-steps approach procedures (Wang & Wang, 2012; Baron & Kenny, 1986;
MacKinnon, Warsi, and Dwyer 1995; Hayes, 2013).
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materiality via its effect on the aggregated line-item. My manipulations appear to have
been successful.
3.4.2 Hypothesis Tests
3.4.2.1 Descriptive statistics for Standard of Care (H1).
Table 3.1, Panels A and B shows descriptive statistics and an ANOVA for the
standard of care that participants are holding the Jones & Company auditors to (i.e.,
participants’ ratings of the extent to which a properly conducted audit could have
detected the alleged misstatement, on a scale from 1 to 10). The more that a properly
conducted audit could have detected a misstatement, the higher the standard of care
participants are holding Jones & Company to for the undetected misstatement.
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Table 3.1
Standard of Care

Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Means for standard of care judgments, standard deviations, and sample sizes by
experimental condition

Aggregation
Aggregated
Mean
st. dev. (n)
Disaggregated
Mean
st. dev. (n)

Larger Misstatement
Estimate Uncertainty
High
Low

Misstatement Size
Smaller Misstatement
Estimate Uncertainty
High
Low

Overalla
Estimate Uncertainty
High
Low

6.56
2.09 (52)

6.48
2.39 (52)

5.96
2.32 (53)

6.20
2.29 (55)

6.26
2.21 (105)

6.43
2.27 (53)

6.90
1.72 (52)

5.69
2.25 (52)

6.79
1.77 (56)

6.06
2.26 (105)

Panel B: Analysis of variance for standard of care judgments
Sum of
Mean
Source
Squares
df Square
Estimate uncertainty
19.73
1
19.73
Misstatement size
20.00
1
20.00
Aggregation
2.51
1
2.51
Estimate uncertainty × misstatement size
5.84
1
5.84
Aggregation × estimate uncertainty
13.05
1
13.05
Aggregation × misstatement size
< 0.01
1 < 0.01
Three-way interaction
0.63
1
0.63
Error
1,924.58
417
4.62

6.34
2.34
(107)
6.84
1.74
(108)

F
4.27
4.33
0.54
1.27
2.83
0.00
0.14

p
0.039
0.019 b
0.461
0.261
0.047 b
0.984
0.711

F
6.78
4.33
0.44

p
0.005 b
0.019 b
0.821

T
−1.72
0.66
2.65
0.27

p
0.043 b
0.507
0.004 b
0.785

Panel C: Hypothesis tests
Sum of
Squares
31.29
20.00
10.14

Source
Ordinal interaction contrast (+3, −1, −1,
Misstatement
size
−1) c
Residual between-cells effects

df
1
1
5

Mean
Square
31.29
20.00
2.03

Panel D: Supplemental simple effects tests
Simple effect
Effect of aggregation on standard of care given lower estimate
Effect
of aggregation on standard of care given higher estimate
uncertainty
Effect
of lower estimate uncertainty on standard of care given
uncertainty
Effect
of lower estimate uncertainty on standard of care given
disaggregation
aggregation
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Table 3.1, Continued
Standard of Care
Notes:
a
The overall means in Panel A collapsed across misstatement size are the least-squares
means of the significant estimate uncertainty × misstatement size interaction shown in
Panel B (p = 0.047). Because misstatement size does not interact significantly with either
aggregation or estimate uncertainty (p’s ≥ 0.261, Panel B), results within each
misstatement size condition in Panel A are statistically similar to those collapsed across
misstatement size in Panel A (e.g., Bowlin et al., 2015). The only systematic difference is
that stan
dard of care judgments are higher for larger undetected material
misstatements than for smaller undetected material misstatements (i.e., the main effect of
misstatement size in Panel B, p = 0.019).
b

These tests show significant effects with directional expectations, and therefore are the
one-tailed p-values of the t-tests associated with the F-statistic, as applicable (e.g.,
Kachelmeier & Williamson, 2010, Bowlin et al., 2015). The remaining p-values represent
two-tailed t-tests.
c

This contrast test assigns contrast weights of +3 to the low estimate
uncertainty/disaggregated conditions, and −1 to the low estimate uncertainty/aggregated
conditions, the high estimate uncertainty/aggregated conditions, and the high estimate
uncertainty/disaggregated conditions.
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As expected, there is a positive main effect of misstatement size on standard of
care such that auditors are held to a higher standard of care when the misstatement is
larger than when it is smaller (6.59 vs. 6.16, t = 2.08, F = 4.33 in Table 3.1, Panel B, p =
0.019). In addition, I observe a statistically significant aggregation × estimate uncertainty
interaction (F = 2.83, p = 0.047; Table 3.1, Panel B). The statistical significance of this
interaction is consistent with my formal test of H1, which follows. Figure 3.1 shows the
means for this interaction. There are no significant interactions in the ANOVA involving
misstatement size in my ANOVA table (Table 3.1, Panel B). This indicates that (besides
the main effect of misstatement size), the aggregation × estimate uncertainty interaction
pictured in Figure 3.1 is statistically similar across the larger and smaller misstatement
size conditions (e.g., Bowlin et al. 2015).

Figure 3.1
Standard of Care Judgments
7.2

6.84

6.8

6.4

6.26

6.34

6.06

Aggregated

6.0

Disaggregated

5.6
High estimate uncertainty

Low estimate uncertainty
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3.4.2.2 Tests of H1.
H1 predicts that jurors will hold auditors to a relatively high standard of care for a
disaggregated material misstatement of lower estimate uncertainty, and to a relatively lower
standard of care when the material misstatement is aggregated with other financial statement
line-items, when estimate uncertainty is high, or both. Following Buckless and Ravenscroft
(1990), I test for this expected ordinal interaction using custom contrast weights of +3 for the
disaggregated/low estimate uncertainty conditions and −1 for the remaining conditions (Figure
3.1).9 The test result is statistically significant (t = 2.60, p = 0.005; Table 3.1 Panel C). In
addition, I test whether the +3, −1, −1, −1 test of my expected aggregation × estimate
uncertainty ordinal interaction and the expected main effect of misstatement size together explain
effectively all of the between-cells variance within my experiment by examining the significance
of the residual model variance (Buckless & Ravenscroft, 1990). My findings indicate the
remaining between-cells variance is statistically insignificant (semi-omnibus F = 0.44 < 1; Table
3.1 Panel C).10 This suggests that the +3, −1, −1, −1 ordinal interaction and the misstatement size
main effect provide a good statistical fit for participants’ standard of care judgments and
together explain effectively all of the systematic between-cells effects within this dependent
variable.

9

These contrast weights reflect the expectation based on my theory that the best ex ante case for an effect of
aggregation reducing standard of care judgments is when estimate uncertainty is low, since higher estimate
uncertainty makes the auditors’ task inherently more difficult and should result in lower standard of care judgments
anyway.
10
Bayesian statistical techniques can provide an affirmative test that the cells assigned weights of −1 are equal to
one another (i.e., there is no residual between-cells variance), rather than just the lack of disconfirming evidence that
comes from failing to reject the null hypothesis that they are equal to one another (Bolstad, 2007; Kass & Raftery,
1995), as the semi-omnibus F-test does. These Bayesian analyses indicate that, after controlling for the main effect
of information on standard of care judgments, the cells assigned weights of −1 are statistically equal to one another
(all BF10’s ≤ 0.16; BFInclusion’s ≤ 0.10; Kass & Raftery, 1995).
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3.4.2.3 Supplementary analyses related to H1
I test the simple effects of the aggregation × estimate uncertainty interaction on standard
of care in Panel D of Table 3.1, and find that they are consistent with my theory and
expectations. Aggregation significantly reduces standard of care when there is low estimate
uncertainty (6.34 vs. 6.84 in Figure 3.1, t = −1.72, p = 0.043), but has no effect when there is
high estimate uncertainty (6.26 vs. 6.06 in Figure 3.1, t = 0.66, p = 0.507). As a result, the
decrease in standard of care judgments caused by aggregation is significantly larger within the
low estimate uncertainty conditions than within the high estimate uncertainty conditions (F =
2.83 in 3.1, t = 1.68, p = 0.047). I find that, when the income statement is disaggregated,
participants’ standard of care ratings are significantly higher in the low estimate uncertainty
conditions than in the high estimate uncertainty conditions (6.84 vs. 6.06 in Figure 3.1, t = 2.65,
p = 0.004). However, there is no significant difference between the low and high estimate
uncertainty conditions when the financial statements are aggregated (6.34 vs. 6.26 in Figure 3.1,
t = 0.27, p = 0.785). These results are consistent with my formal tests of H1.
3.4.2.4 Tests of H2
H2 predicts that the joint effect of aggregation and estimate uncertainty on standard of
care will, in turn, influence participants’ negligence judgments. This type of hypothesis is tested
by testing the statistical significance of the indirect path from aggregation × estimate uncertainty
to standard of care to negligence, depicted in Figure 3.2. Such a test does not simply confirm
that standard of care and negligence are bivariately correlated, but rather that the entire path is
significant (i.e., variance in negligence is explained specifically by the variance in standard of
care that is explained by aggregation × estimate uncertainty).

57

As shown in the structural equation model in Figure 3.2, the aggregation × estimate
uncertainty ordinal interaction influences standard of care (H1), and this variance in standard of
care (depicted in Figure 3.1) subsequently influences negligence judgments. Goodness-of-fit
indices indicate that the structural equation model in Figure 3.2 provides an excellent fit to the
data (e.g., Root Mean Square Error of Approximation < 0.001; CFI and Tucker-Lewis Index >
0.999; Weighted Root Mean Square Residual =0.023;Brown,2014).
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Figure 3.2
Aggregation × Estimate Uncertainty Ordinal Interaction, Misstatement Size, Standard of Care, and Negligence
Judgments Structural Equation Model

3, −1, −1, −1
Aggregation × Estimate
Uncertainty
Ordinal Interactiona,b

Direct effect (after controlling for mediator): c′1 = 0.178, p = 0.159c

a1 = 0.390, p =
0.007c
(H1)

a =
0.264, p
= 0.023d

Misstatement Size

Standard of Care

b = 0.430, p < 0.001c,d

Direct effect (after controlling for mediator): c′2 = 0.422, p < 0.001d
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Negligence

Figure 3.2, Continued

Indirect path significance test
Path from 3, −1, −1, −1 Aggregation ×
Estimate Uncertainty ordinal
interaction to Standard of Care to
Negligence (i.e., a1 × b)
Path from 3, −1, −1, −1 Misstatement Size
to Standard of Care to Negligence (i.e.,
a2 × b)

Hypothesis Predicted
Path
test
sign
estimate
H2

95% one-tailed
bootstrapped confidence
interval

Test
result

+

0.168

95% of bootstrapped
estimates > 0.075

Significant

+

0.114

95% of bootstrapped
estimates > 0.024

Significant

Notes:
a

Goodness-of-fit indices indicate that the model produces an excellent fit to the data (e.g.; Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation < 0.001; Comparative Fit Index and Tucker-Lewis Index > 0.999; Weighted Root Mean Square Residual =
0.023; see Brown 2014). The path coefficients a1, a2, b, c′1 and c′2 are consistent with standard Baron and Kenny (1983)
mediation notation, and represent the same concepts.
This model uses weights of 3, −1, −1, −1 to test the expected aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal interaction. I obtain
statistically similar results and fit when we use a structural equation model with the conventional aggregation × estimate
uncertainty ordinal interaction and its constituent main effects as covariates.
b

c

As this figure shows, the effect of the aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal interaction on negligence judgments (Table
3.2) appears to be fully mediated by standard of care. Specifically, holding the size of the misstatement constant, aggregation
of that misstatement with other accounts reduces its perceived impact on its income-statement line-item, which, in turn, drives
its perceived impact on the financial statements as a whole and on the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the financial
statements, consistent with H2. Results in this model are suggestive of full mediation. Specifically, the total effect (i.e., not
controlling for the mediator) of the ordinal interaction on Negligence is statistically significant (p = 0.005, Table 3.2 Panel C),
while the remaining direct effect (c′1), is insignificant after controlling for the mediator (p = 0.159), consistent with full
mediation.
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d

Standard of care also appears to mediate the effect of Misstatement Size on Negligence. As this figure shows, a larger
misstatement increases the standard of care of auditors, which increases negligence judgments. Results of this model are
consistent with partial mediation. That is, the total effect of Misstatement Size on Negligence (i.e., not controlling for the
mediator) is statistically significant (p < 0.005, Table 3.2 Panels B and C), and, while the mediating path is statistically
significant (i.e., bootstrapping test of the indirect, mediating path, a2 × b, is significant, above), the direct path (c′2) remains
significant even after controlling for the mediator.
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To formally test H2, I examine whether the product of coefficients a1 × b in my
structural model (Figure 3.2) is significantly positive. If it is, then the entire path from the
ordinal interaction to standard of care to negligence is statistically significant, and the
total effect of the total effect of the aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal
interaction on negligence is significantly mediated by standard of care (Hayes, 2009,
2013). This test is most reliably done using bootstrapping procedures, which make no
underlying assumptions about the distributional properties of the data (Hayes, 2009,
2013). In these procedures, I drew 5,000 random subsamples of my data, computing the
coefficients a1 and b for each subsample, and determining whether their product is
positive at least 95% of the time (Hayes, 2009, 2013). I find that the model estimate for
the indirect path (a1 × b) is 0.168, and 95% of the bootstrapped estimates > 0.075 (a
confidence interval that does not contain zero and therefore is statistically significant). I
obtain statistically similar results if we use the conventional ANOVA interaction term for
the aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal interaction, rather than the +3, −1, −1, −1
contrast weights used in Figure 3.2. I also obtain statistically similar findings regardless
of whether we test H2 using Baron-and-Kenny causal steps approaches, the Sobel test,
the Goodman test, and Aroian test, or bootstrapping procedures, within either a linear
regression or a structural equation modeling framework (Wang & Wang, 2012; Baron &
Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon et al., 1995; Hayes, 2013; Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng,
2007). Thus, I find strong evidence that the effects described in H1 go on to influence
negligence judgments against the auditors. This result supports H2.
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3.4.2.5 Supplementary analyses related to H2
Supplementary analysis of participants’ negligence judgments suggests that the
indirect path tested in H2 results in negligence judgments that occur in a similar pattern
as standard of care judgments. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for negligence
as a dependent variable appear in Panels A and B of Table 3.2.

63

Table 3.2
Negligence Judgments

Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Means for negligence judgments, standard deviations, and sample sizes by experimental
condition

Aggregation
Aggregated
Mean
st. dev. (n)
Disaggregated
Mean
st. dev. (n)

Larger Misstatement
Estimate Uncertainty
High
Low

Misstatement Size
Smaller Misstatement
Estimate Uncertainty
High
Low

Overalla
Estimate Uncertainty
High
Low

6.29
1.82 (52)

6.08
2.02 (53)

5.46
1.99 (54)

5.05
2.09 (55)

5.88
1.90 (106)

6.51
2.21 (53)

6.72
1.77 (54)

5.58
1.78 (52)

6.07
1.99 (56)

6.04
1.99 (105)

Panel B: Analysis of variance for negligence judgments
Sum of
Source
Squares
df
Estimate uncertainty
0.05
1
Misstatement size
78.80
1
Aggregation
26.76
1
Estimate uncertainty × misstatement size
0.05
1
Aggregation × estimate uncertainty
11.83
1
Aggregation × misstatement size
0.46
1
Three-way interaction
1.53
1
Error
1,623.12
421

Mean
Square
0.05
78.80
26.76
0.05
11.83
0.46
1.53
3.86

5.57
2.05
(108)
6.40
1.88
(110)

F
p
0.01
0.910
20.44 < 0.001 b
6.94
0.009
0.01
0.909
3.07
0.040 b
0.12
0.729
0.40
0.530

Panel C: Supplemental contrast tests
Sum of
Squares
26.46
78.80
15.16

Source
Ordinal interaction contrast (+3, −1, −1,
Misstatement
size
−1) c
Residual between-cells effects

df
1
1
5

Mean
Square
26.46
78.80
3.03

F
p
6.86
0.005 b
20.44 < 0.001 b
0.79
0.560

Panel D: Supplemental simple effects tests
Simple effect
Effect of aggregation on negligence given lower estimate uncertainty
Effect of aggregation on negligence given higher estimate uncertainty
Effect of lower estimate uncertainty on negligence given disaggregation
Effect of lower estimate uncertainty on negligence given aggregation
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T
−3.13
−0.62
1.32
−1.16

p
0.002 b
0.536
0.094 b
0.248

Table 3.2, Continued
Notes:
a
The overall means in Panel A collapsed across misstatement size are the least-squares
means of the significant estimate uncertainty × misstatement size interaction shown in
Panel B (p = 0.040). Because misstatement size does not interact significantly with either
aggregation or estimate uncertainty (p’s ≥ 0.530, Panel B), results within each
misstatement size condition in Panel A are statistically similar to those collapsed across
misstatement size in Panel A (e.g., Bowlin et al., 2015). The only systematic difference is
that negligence judgments are higher for larger undetected material misstatements than
for smaller undetected material misstatements (i.e., the main effect of misstatement size
in Panel B, p < 0.001).
b

These tests show significant effects with directional expectations, and therefore are the
one-tailed p-values of the t-tests associated with the F-statistic, as applicable (e.g.,
Kachelmeier & Williamson, 2010; Bowlin et al., 2015). The remaining p-values represent
two-tailed t-tests.
c

This contrast test assigns contrast weights of +3 to the low estimate
uncertainty/disaggregated conditions, and −1 to the low estimate uncertainty/aggregated
conditions, the high estimate uncertainty/aggregated conditions, and the high estimate
uncertainty/disaggregated conditions.
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Results for negligence in Table 3.2 are generally similar to those for standard of
care in Table 3.1. Specifically, I find a positive main effect of misstatement size such that
participants’ assessments of auditor negligence were higher when the misstatement was
larger than when it was smaller (6.40 vs. 5.54, t = 4.52, F = 20.44 in Table 3.2 Panel B, p
< 0.001). Also similar to my results for standard of care, besides this main effect,
misstatement size does not interact significantly with my other manipulations in
participants’ negligence judgments (p’s ≥ 0.530, Table 3.2 Panel B). In addition, I
observe a statistically significant aggregation × estimate uncertainty interaction on
negligence judgments (F = 3.07, p = 0.040; Table 3.2 Panel B).
Figure 3.3
Negligence Judgments
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Figure 3.3 plots the means of this interaction. Similar to the findings for standard
of care, I find that the +3, −1, −1, −1 contrast weight test on the aggregation × estimate
uncertainty ordinal interaction on negligence judgments is statistically significant (t =
2.62, p = 0.005; Table 3.2 Panel C). Furthermore, I find that this ordinal interaction and
the main effect of misstatement size on negligence judgments together explain effectively
all of the between-cells variance within my experiment (residual model variance semiomnibus F = 0.79 < 1, Table 3.2 Panel C; Buckless & Ravenscroft, 1990).11 Thus, the +3,
−1, −1, −1 ordinal interaction and the misstatement size main effect provide a good
statistical fit for participants’ negligence judgments and together explain effectively all of
the systematic between-cells effects for this dependent variable. Finally, simple effects
tests of this interaction using negligence as a dependent variable generally replicate to
those for standard of care, and are similarly consistent with the expected +3, −1, −1, −1
ordinal interaction (Table 3.2 Panel D).12 Thus, the results for negligence judgments are
generally consistent with those for standard of care.

Bayesian statistical techniques provide an affirmative test that the cells assigned weights of −1 are equal
to one another (i.e., there is no residual between-cells variance), rather than just failing to reject the null
hypothesis that they are equal (Bolstad, 2007; Kass & Raftery, 1995). These analyses indicate that, after
controlling for the main effect of information on negligence judgments, the cells assigned weights of −1 are
statistically equal to one another (all BF10’s ≤ 0.49; BFInclusion’s ≤ 0.30; Kass & Raftery, 1995).
12
Visual comparison of the means for standard of care and negligence in Figures 3 and 5 show qualitative
(but not significant) differences among some of the statistically insignificant simple effects. As Hayes
(2013) and Preacher and Hayes (2008) point out, even when an overall path is significant, it is possible for
the pattern of means observed in one response variable earlier in the path to change in subsequent response
variables that come farther down the path, because other sources of variance will also impact each
subsequent response variable. For this reason, Fanning et al. (2015) argue for testing hypotheses using the
response variable that is the closest and best test of the underlying theory as the primary dependent variable
of interest, and then looking at subsequent dependent variables, recognizing that there will be other sources
of variance (including noisy variance with respect to the hypothesis tests) entering subsequent judgments
father along the path. For my study, my theory predicts the joint effect of aggregation and estimate
uncertainty on the basis of how they influence individuals’ perceptions of whether the auditors should have
been able to detect the undetected misstatement (i.e., whether a properly conducted audit could have been
able to detect the misstatement, or standard of care as I define it). These effects on standard of care should
subsequently influence negligence judgments as individuals consider what was done relative to what
auditors should have been able to do when forming their negligence judgments. My structural equation
model (Figure 3.2) and formal tests of H2 are supportive of this.
11
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3.4.2.6 Additional supplementary analyses.
Aside from the manipulation checks and my dependent variables, I also collected
participants’ beliefs that the auditors had the obligation to value the machinery and its
related impairment loss accurately (perceived obligation) on a scale from 1 to 10.
Participants’ mean judgments (7.97) were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t
= 28.14, p < 0.001), and did not vary significantly by experimental condition (omnibus F
= 0.95 < 1).13 Thus, participants across conditions believed that auditors had a uniformly
high obligation to value the machinery and its related impairment loss accurately, yet
whether they held auditors accountable for failing to do so varied depending on the joint
effects of aggregation and estimate uncertainty (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Hence, I observe a
disconnect between participants’ perceptions of auditors’ obligations and the extent to
which they hold auditors accountable for failing to meet those obligations. This suggests
that the effects I observe in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are likely unconscious (and therefore
pervasive and difficult for individuals to self-correct; Sherman et al. 2008). As a result,
the lack of guidance in accounting and auditing standards on financial statement
aggregation is likely to include unintentional spillover effects on juror decision making in
cases of accounting failure litigation.
3.5 Conclusion
My experimental findings suggest that high levels of income statement
aggregation have effects on juror decision making contrary to the intent of standard
setters. Specifically, while participants in my study recognized that auditors should have
13

Bayesian statistical techniques provide an affirmative test of null effects, rather than failing to reject the
null (Bolstad, 2007; Kass & Raftery, 1995). These analyses provide affirmative evidence that perceived
obligation to detect the misstatement was similar across conditions (all BF 10’s ≤ 0.36; BFInclusion’s ≤ 0.27;
Kass & Raftery, 1995).
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more ability to prevent material misstatement with low inherent estimate uncertainty,
they still held auditors to a lower standard of care for failing to detect them when the
misstated account was aggregated with other clean accounts in the same income
statement line-item. Given the laxity of accounting standards on the issue, many
companies (particularly those reporting under U.S. accounting standards) opt for high
levels of income statement aggregation (Libby & Emett, 2014). Given that auditors are
less likely to prevent misstatements that occur in aggregated income statement line-items
(Libby & Brown, 2013), income statement aggregation may increase the likelihood of
accounting failures. Yet, my findings suggest that aggregation may increase the risk of
uncorrected material misstatements in the financial statements while simultaneously
providing one of the gatekeepers of the financial statements (auditors) with some shelter
from the legal implications of some of those uncorrected misstatements. Moreover, these
effects are likely to be the result of unconscious effects on juror decision making. That is,
even as my participants recognized on a between-subjects basis that auditors have more
ability to evaluate less uncertain estimates (regardless of its aggregation or
disaggregation), and even as they believed that the auditor had a uniformly high
obligation to correct the undetected misstatement (regardless of experimental condition),
they still held auditors to a lower standard of care and found them less negligent for
failing to detect the less uncertain estimates simply by the simple presentation effect of
line-item aggregation. The disconnect between jurors beliefs about auditors ability and
obligation for detecting the material misstatement, and the extent to which they hold
auditors responsible for failing to do so, suggests that standard setters’ lack of guidance
on income statement aggregation may have unintended consequences that they do not
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anticipate. Thus, I add to the small but growing literature on line-item aggregation in the
financial statements, which reports mixed findings from other settings on the implications
of financial statement aggregation (e.g., Bloomfield et al., 2015; Elliott et al., 2015;
Libby & Brown 2013).
My findings also have implications for the auditing literature on estimate
uncertainty. There has been widespread concern that higher levels of estimate uncertainty
open up auditors to excessive litigation risk (e.g., Christensen et al., 2012; Bell & Griffin,
2012). While estimate uncertainty may incrementally increase the likelihood of litigation,
my findings suggest that, once in litigation, higher levels of estimate uncertainty actually
lower auditors’ legal exposure to negligence judgments when the financial statements are
relatively disaggregated, by way of its effects on jurors’ standard of care for auditors.
Thus, once in the courtroom, high estimate uncertainty can potentially decrease (rather
than increase) auditors’ litigation risks under common conditions.
My findings are subject to limitations. I do not test all aspects of aggregation and
estimate uncertainty that may influence my findings. Furthermore, other task-,
environmental-, or decision-maker factors may moderate, alter, or impose boundary
conditions on the effects that we demonstrate. As the implications of line-item
aggregation and estimate uncertainty are not yet well understood at various stages of the
managerial decision making, financial reporting, investing, and corporate governance
cycle, future research may examine the effects that I document as they affect other facets
of accounting judgment and decision-making.
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CHAPTER 4
THE OPPOSITE EFFECTS OF HIGH ESTIMATE UNCERTAINTY ON
JURORS' JUDGMENTS AND ON LAWYERS' SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN
AUDITOR NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION
4.1 Introduction
Auditors have become increasingly responsible to express opinions on valuation
estimates for illiquid assets with no observable market value (Griffin 2014). The
estimation techniques for these assets often involve highly subjective assumptions and
therefore highly uncertain valuations. Auditors and accounting researchers have
expressed concerns that high levels of estimate uncertainty will subject auditors to
unfairly high litigation risk (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012).
Auditors’ litigation risk has always been large, but concerns over it have grown as the
size of inherent uncertainty in valuation estimates has increased. For example,
Christensen et al. (2012) note that in many modern cases the range of estimate
uncertainty exceeds the size material misstatements by several times, suggesting that
auditors can potentially face onerous litigation costs as the level of estimate uncertainty
leads to material misstatements that may be beyond auditor’s ability to fully control.
From 1995-2007, the largest six accounting firms paid out $5.66 billion to resolve over
362 cases (US Treasury 2008). In 2007, the litigation and practice-protection costs of the
firms totaled 15.1% of the firms’ overall audit-related revenue (US Treasury 2008).
In this study, I develop theory and predictions that high levels of estimate
uncertainty in an undetected material misstatement may have directionally opposite
effects on auditor liability, depending on whether the case is judged by jurors in a trial or
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settled by lawyers in out-of-court negotiations. In the second study of my dissertation, I
demonstrate that high estimate uncertainty causes jurors to judge auditors less harshly for
undetected material misstatements that occur in relatively disaggregated financial
statement line-items. In contrast, I predict and find that high estimate uncertainty causes
auditors’ lawyers to believe that the auditors are more vulnerable for failing to detect a
material misstatement, and become willing to make more concessions in out-of-court
settlement negotiation, regardless of whether the misstatement is in an aggregated or
disaggregated line-item. I predict that these directionally opposite effects stem from
lawyers sensing vulnerability to juror judgments but predicting jurors’ reactions to
uncertainty in the wrong direction.
I test my hypotheses in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. Lawyers
read an auditor negligence litigation case as counsel to the auditors. The case (adapted
from prior research) involves an alleged material misstatement in the valuation of highly
customized mining and quarrying machinery. Investors allege that a material impairment
in the machinery should have been apparent to the auditors during the audit, and the
investors experienced losses as a result of the materially misstated audited financial
statements. I manipulated whether the valuation and impairment judgment involved
higher or lower inherent estimate uncertainty, and whether the alleged misstatement
occurred in an account that was either aggregated with other accounts into a single
income-statement line-item, or disaggregated as its own income statement line-item (see
Libby and Brown 2013; Libby and Emett 2014; FASB 2010). Lawyers rated (as counsel
to the auditors) how strong of a position they felt the auditors had, how strong of a
position they felt the investors had, how likely the case would be settled out of court, how
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committed they would be to their initial settlement offer, how willing they would be to
make concessions during negotiation, their negotiating goal for the minimum payout (in
dollars) they would hope to get the opposition to accept, their negotiating limit of the
maximum payout they would be willing to accept, and final negotiated settlement amount
they expected their clients to pay. Furthermore, since lawyers read the same experimental
case used in the second study of my dissertation to measure mock jurors’ judgments, I
asked the lawyers to predict the standard of care that the mock jurors would hold auditors
to, as well as the mock jurors’ negligence judgments for the auditors, and directly
compare the lawyers’ predictions of mock juror behavior to mock jurors’ actual behavior.
Results show that lawyers make incorrect predictions about the effects of estimate
uncertainty on jurors’ standard of care for auditors and on jurors’ perceptions of auditor
negligence. Specifically, while high estimate uncertainty leads jurors to hold auditors to a
lower standard of care and judge them as less negligent for undetected material
misstatements in relatively disaggregated financial statement line-items, lawyers
mistakenly expect jurors to hold auditors to a higher standard of care and judge auditors
more negligent when estimate uncertainty is high (regardless of whether the misstatement
occurred in an aggregated or disaggregated line-item).
This result is consistent hypothesis I build from prior research and theory.
Specifically, I theorize that expert-lawyers would adopt an overly simplistic perspective
of novice-jurors’ performance evaluations and attributions of blame. My findings suggest
further that these erroneous beliefs about jurors (and their reactions to estimate
uncertainty) result in significant and unnecessary out-of-court settlement losses to
auditors. Specifically, as auditors’ lawyers misperceive the direction of the effect of
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estimate uncertainty on juror judgments, estimate uncertainty concurrently leads lawyers
to mistakenly assume that their clients hold a weaker position relative to the opposition,
makes them less committed to their initial negotiating position, more willing to concede,
adopt less ambitious negotiating goals and limits for their clients’ minimum and
maximum possible payouts (respectively), and ultimately expect to settle for larger
amounts of money in out-of-court settlement. Furthermore, structural equation modeling
of lawyers’ judgments suggest that all of these effects of estimate uncertainty on lawyers’
negotiating behavior stem from the lawyers’ mistaken beliefs about jurors.
Despite the worse negotiation prospects for auditors in the high estimate
uncertainty conditions, lawyers across all conditions uniformly believed that the case had
a high likelihood of being settled out of court. This is consistent with evidence suggesting
that the majority of auditor liability amounts are determined in out-of-court settlement
(e.g., Palmrose 1991). Thus, the divergent effects I find on juror judgments and lawyers’
out-of-court settlement judgments are important to understanding auditor litigation risk,
given the prominent role out-of-court settlement plays in the resolution of auditor
negligence litigation.
This study has important theoretical and practical contributions. First, this study
contributes to the literature on high estimate uncertainty and auditor litigation risk, by
showing that whether estimate uncertainty increases or decreases auditor litigation risk
for undetected material misstatements depends on whether the litigation is settled by
lawyers negotiating out of court or by jury. Second, auditors’ legal counsel may have
systematic misperceptions of juror judgments, which cause them to systematically
underestimate the strength of their client’s position relative to the opposition and
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therefore concede more in negotiations. Thus, lawyers’ potential misunderstanding of
their clients’ vulnerability to jurors may carry significant costs for auditors, in the most
common venue for resolving auditor negligence litigation. Third, this study has
implications for auditor negligence research more broadly. The vast majority of auditor
liability is determined in out-of-court settlement (Palmrose 1991, 1999), and yet the vast
majority of research on the resolution of auditor negligence litigation has focused on
juror judgments (as Donelson, Kadous, and McInnes [2014] point out). While juror
judgments are important to understand auditor litigation risk in a non-trivial proportion of
cases, my study illustrates that auditors may face very different litigation risk in out-ofcourt settlement, where the vast majority of auditor liability is determined. Thus, my
study responds to the call of Donelson et al. (2014) to investigate how well auditors’
litigation risk, as proxied in juror studies, generalizes to auditors’ litigation risk in out-ofcourt settlement.
4.2 Hypothesis Development
4.2.1 Estimate Uncertainty and Auditors’ Litigation Risk
Fair value measurement is becoming a higher risk for financial reporters, auditors,
and investors, because the standards and estimation techniques are increasingly complex,
subjective, and uncertain (e.g., Ayres, Neal, Reid and Shipman 2014; FASB 2011;
KPMG 2013; Ramana and Watts 2012). Auditors may not have the appropriate expertise
for many complex estimates, and they may audit them using techniques more applicable
to ordinary transactions (Griffith et al. 2015a). In particular, the range of uncertainty
surrounding some accounting estimates can exceed materiality thresholds by several
times (Christensen et al. 2012). Furthermore, auditors may face excessively high
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litigation risk if investors and other stakeholders do not appreciate the difficult position
that high inherent estimate uncertainty places auditors in when trying to identify material
misstatements (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012).
However, how high estimate uncertainty directly influences auditors’ litigation
risk is unclear. On one hand, high estimate uncertainty increases the likelihood of
material misstatements in unaudited financial statements (Griffith et al. 2015a). On the
other hand, auditors react to high estimate uncertainty by requiring more audit
adjustments (Griffin 2014). The net effect on actual litigation risk is unknown because, as
Donelson et al. (2014, 63) note, there is only minimal archival data on damage awards,
especially for cases settled out of court. Nevertheless, archival research suggests a
widespread belief among auditors that higher estimate uncertainty increases their
litigation risk for undetected material misstatements in audited financial statements, as
manifested in higher audit fees and auditor-client resignations (Ayres et al. 2014;
Goncharov, Reidl and Sellhorn 2014). In this study, I examine the possibility that the
effect of high estimate uncertainty on an auditor’s litigation risk for undetected material
misstatements may go in opposite directions, depending on whether a case is judged by
jurors or negotiated by lawyers in out-of-court settlement.
4.2.2 Juror Judgments and Lawyer Settlement Negotiations
The majority of auditor liability is determined in out-of-court settlement. Using
Palmrose’s (1999) auditor litigation database, I investigated the frequency with which
auditor liability is determined at trial versus out-of-court settlement, and summarized the
results in Table 4.1. The database includes the resolution type of 235 cases that proceeded
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to resolution from 1960-1995.14 Results of these analyses suggest that approximately
73% of lawsuits were resolved by settlement (settlement to avoid litigation, pre-trial
settlement, or post-trial settlement; Table 4.1). Close to 19% were resolved by trial (or
post-trial appeal; Table 4.1), which would include both jury trials and judge-only trials.
Finally, approximately 8% were resolved by one or more resolution type.15

14

The database includes another 157 apparently frivolous lawsuits that were either withdrawn by the
plaintiff or dismissed before proceeding to resolution, and for which there was no auditor liability. Since
anyone can file a frivolous lawsuit, I exclude dismissed or withdrawn lawsuits from these analyses.
15
For cases involving a combination of resolution types, the database does not identify which two or more
resolution types are involved.
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Table 4.1
Frequency of Auditor Litigation in Palmrose (1999) Database, by Settlement Type over Time

Resolution Type:

Before 1970

1970-1979

1980-1989

1990-1995

Total

Settlement
Settlement to avoid
litigation
Pre-trial settlement
Post-trial settlement
Subtotal

0
3
0
3

0.0%
1.3%
0.0%
1.3%

1
28
0
29

0.4%
11.9%
0.0%
12.3%

3
32
2
37

1.3%
13.6%
0.9%
15.7%

28
73
2
103

11.9%
31.1%
0.9%
43.8%

32
136
4
172

13.6%
57.9%
1.7%
73.2%

Trial Resolution
Trial
Post-trial appeal
Subtotal

0
0
0

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

1
5
6

0.4%
2.1%
2.6%

7
16
23

3.0%
6.8%
9.8%

4
11
15

1.7%
4.7%
6.4%

12
32
44

5.1%
13.6%
18.7%

Combination (more than one
resolution type)

0

0.0%

2

0.9%

6

2.6%

11

4.7%

19

8.1%

Total

3

1.3%

37

15.7%

66

28.1%

129

54.9%

235

100.0%

_________________
Notes:
This table summarizes the frequency of cases that proceeded to resolution in Palmrose’s (1999) auditor litigation database. The
database includes another 157 apparently frivolous lawsuits that were either withdrawn by the plaintiff or altogether dismissed
before proceeding to resolution, and for which there was no auditor liability. The subcategory “combination” shows cases with
more than one resolution type, though the database does not identify which two or more resolution types were involved.
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Given the massive total liability faced by auditors suggests that all of these
resolution types are economically significant. The $5.66 billion paid by the largest six
accounting firms to resolve litigation from 1995-2007 for 362 cases (US Treasury 2008).
In 2007, a full 15.1% of those firms’ audit revenues went to litigation and practiceprotection costs (US Treasury 2008). Moreover, even the prospects of auditor liability
influence auditor behavior on the vast majority of cases which are not litigated. Yet, as
Donelson et al. (2014) point out, research on the resolution process has focused almost
exclusively on juror judgment and decision making, despite the fact that the vast majority
of auditor litigation is resolved in out-of-court settlement. As a result, very little is known
yet about out-of-court settlement of auditor litigation, factors that influence it, or how it
differs from juror judgments (Donelson et al. 2014, 63).
4.2.3 Estimate Uncertainty, Juror Judgments, and Lawyer Negotiations in Out-of-Court
Settlement
Legal theory has assumed that settlement negotiations are influenced in part by
lawyer’s expectations about how jurors would decide a case if it were to go to trial
(Seabury 2012). As Grenier et al. (2015) and Donelson et al. (2014) note, accounting
research has implicitly or explicitly relied on this assumption when asserting that juror
studies provide a reasonable proxy for auditor’s litigation risk overall. However, this
assumption also relies on an assumption that lawyer’s expectations about juror judgments
are accurate (Alexander 1991; Seabury 2013). Yet, as Seabury (2013, 15) states in the
legal research literature, “despite the theoretical importance of litigant expectations
[about jury judgments] in driving settlement behavior, we have relatively little knowledge
about how expectations are actually formed.” Accounting research has also not yet
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studied the accuracy or inaccuracy of lawyer’s expectations, factors that systematically
influence that accuracy or inaccuracy, and whether or how those accurate or inaccurate
expectations influence subsequent settlement negotiations (Donelson et al. 2014).
Accounting estimate uncertainty provides an interesting contextual factor to test
these assumptions. Besides being a timely factor with important practical implications for
auditors and their litigation risks (e.g., Hay, Knechel, and Willekens 2014; Griffith et al.
2015a, 2015b; Griffin 2014), it is also a theoretically rich factor for testing the accuracy
of lawyer’s expectations of juror behavior, because there are at least two possible ways
jurors would react to high levels of estimate uncertainty, with potentially divergent
implications.
Under one perspective of juror judgment, jurors react negatively to high estimate
uncertainty and see the auditor more as blameworthy for not being more careful and
expressing an incorrect audit opinion amid high uncertainty. This perspective focuses on
jurors having a generalized dislike of uncertainty, reacting with negative emotional
affect, and allowing that affect to spread as they look to find a cause for plaintiff’s losses
and spread blame. This perspective sees jurors as highly naïve, since it expects to react
negatively to uncertainty, regardless of its source, not recognizing the role that
environmental and chance factors beyond the auditor’s control play in a misstated
estimate of inherently high uncertainty. Furthermore, jurors may be so motivated by
plaintiff’s losses to lay blame that they do not attempt any attributions of a failure to
alternative causes. Under this perspective, high estimate uncertainty would elevate jurors’
assessments of auditor negligence.
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In contrast to this more naïve perspective, another perspective recognizes jurors as
more boundedly rational (cf. Hastie and Dawes 2010). According to Attribution Theory,
evaluators of other’s performance attempt to attribute an observed failure (e.g., an
uncorrected material misstatement in audited financial statements) to either internal
causes, relational causes, or external causes, searching for appropriate cues (Eberly et al.
2011; Burton et al. 2014). Internal causes include factors within the evaluatee’s control
(e.g., auditor negligence), external causes include factors outside of the evaluatee’s
control (e.g., chance), and relational causes include factors that arise from interactions
between the evaluatee’s and other actors (e.g., auditor independence problems leading to
undetected management fraud). Furthermore, evaluators do not rush to attribute all
possible causes of an observed failure to one of these three sources. Instead, evaluators
tend to cautiously withhold some attributions, instead holding some “belief in reserve”
(e.g., Shafer 1976; Curley 2007). This tendency to hold belief in reserve increases as
evaluators cannot clearly attribute the cause anywhere, as the stakes of their judgment are
high, and as their relative familiarity and confidence with the subject matter decreases
(e.g., Macchi, Osherson and Krantz 1999). This cautious behavior has been demonstrated
among jurors (Curley 2007).
The second study of my dissertation proposes this latter (less naïve) perspective of
juror judgment and use it to predict that jurors will react to high estimate uncertainty by
evaluating auditors more (rather than less) favorably. In particular, the second study of
my dissertation proposes that jurors evaluate auditor negligence by thinking naturally in
terms of whether a properly conducted audit would have corrected a material
misstatement. They refer to this as jurors’ “standard of care” for auditors, since, the
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more jurors believe that a properly conducted audit would have corrected a misstatement,
the higher a standard of care jurors are holding auditors to for failing to detect the
misstatement. Attribution Theory suggests that, thinking in terms of this standard of care,
jurors would then be able to see that high estimate uncertainty lowers the extent to which
even a properly conducted audit could have detected a misstatement. Thus, high estimate
uncertainty would make jurors less likely to attribute the cause of the accounting failure
to internal factors within the auditors control (i.e., auditor negligence).
The second study of my dissertation finds supportive evidence of this latter (less
naïve) perspective of jurors. Specifically, they presented mock jurors with an auditor
negligence case, involving an undetected material misstatement. In a 2 × 2 × 2 betweensubjects experiment, they manipulated the level of uncertainty surrounding the material
misstatement (higher vs. lower estimate uncertainty), whether the misstated account
appeared as its own line-item on the income statement or whether it was aggregated into
a single line-item with other, non-misstated accounts (aggregated vs. disaggregated
income statement), as well as the size of the material misstatement (larger vs. smaller).
The level of aggregation or disaggregation of accounts in financial statement line-items is
discretionary to reporting firms, and financial statements in practice vary widely in their
level of aggregation or disaggregation (Libby and Brown 2013; Libby and Emett 2014;
Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 2015). Holding all other aspects of a material misstatement
constant, disaggregating the materially misstated account with its own line-item on the
income statement makes the misstatement appear larger with respect to the size of its
line-item, even though it has no effect on the size of the misstatement relative to net
income, sales, total assets, or any other line of the financial statements. However, because
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disaggregation makes the misstatement appear more salient, the second study of my
dissertation finds that it elevates both the standard of care they hold the auditors to for
failing to find the misstatement, as well their assessments of auditor negligence, but only
when estimate uncertainty is inherently low. In contrast, when estimate uncertainty is
high, jurors appear more capable of attributing the cause of the misstatement to factors
other than auditor negligence, hold auditors to a lower standard of care for failing to
detect the misstatement, and find them less negligent. The findings from the second study
of my dissertation appear in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3.16
Lawyers in out-of-court settlement will be unlikely to predict juror judgments
accurately. To do so requires a prediction of what would occur if a case under settlement
were to go to trial, and a large body of psychology has shown that even experts are bad
predictors (see, e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997). In particular, predictions in this task
require that experts (litigation lawyers in out-of-court settlement) predict what novices’
(i.e., jurors’) judgments would be. Individuals in general tend to place high confidence in
their own judgments and give others less credit for being boundedly rational (Pronin
2002, 2007; Pronin et al. 2004; Ross et al. 2004). Experts in particular self-servingly
place too much confidence in their own judgments relative to novices’ judgments
(Armstrong 1991; Thom-Santelli, Cosley, and Gay 2010). When people feel that they

16

In the second study of my dissertation, the pattern of findings shown in Figure 1 was robust to the size of
the material misstatement. That is, I tested the estimate uncertainty × disaggregation interaction shown in
Figure 1 under conditions of (1) a material misstatement that was both quantitatively and qualitatively
material, and (2) a material misstatement that was larger (by several times). Figure 1 shows the second
study of my dissertation's results within the conditions of the more standard quantitatively material
misstatement, and the same pattern occurs for the larger material misstatement as well. For my experiment
studying attorneys’ settlements, I chose to use the second study's experimental conditions using the more
standard quantitatively material misstatement, to demonstrate significant effects on attorneys’ out-of-court
settlement negotiations on more quantitatively normal misstatements, without needing to resort to
extremely large material misstatements to demonstrate effects. As a result, the means shown in Figure 1 for
jurors’ judgments are the basis for comparison to attorneys’ beliefs about jurors’ judgments.
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belong to an expert or enlightened group, they become territorial, are more likely to
assume that others’ judgments are poor and naïve, and give novices less credit for being
boundedly rational (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, and Ross 2005; Thom-Santelli et al. 2010).
Empirical research suggests that lawyers often tend to view themselves overconfidently
(e.g., Birke and Fox 1999; Babcock and Pogarsky 1999; Kiser, Asher and McShane
2008), suggesting that they may not always give jurors adequate credit for being
boundedly rational.
If so, then lawyers may be more likely to adopt the more naïve perspective of
juror decision making with respect to predicting the effects of estimate uncertainty on
their judgments. That is, lawyers would likely expect jurors to hold auditors more
responsible for failing to detect a material misstatement when uncertainty is high. Viewed
this way by lawyers, high estimate uncertainty would elevate both (1) the standard of care
jurors hold auditors to for failing to detect the material misstatement and (2) juror
assessments of auditor negligence. If lawyers hold this viewpoint, their predictions of
jurors would be inaccurate, compared to actual effects of estimate uncertainty on juror
judgments (see Figure 3.1 and 3.3). This discussion suggests the following hypotheses:
H1:

Auditors’ legal counsel will incorrectly predict jurors’ standard of care for
auditors to be greater when estimate uncertainty is higher than when
estimate uncertainty is lower.

H2:

Auditors’ legal counsel will incorrectly predict jurors’ negligence
judgments for auditors to be greater when estimate uncertainty is higher
than when estimate uncertainty is lower.

H1 and H2 have important implications for negotiation outcomes and, ultimately,
auditors’ litigation risk. Out-of-court negotiations over settlement are likely to be
influenced by a number of factors, but they are likely to reflect lawyers’ predictions of
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when they are more or less vulnerable to jurors. If so, then inaccuracies in lawyers’
predictions are likely to influence their perceptions of the strength of their negotiating
position and of the opposition’s negotiating position, their willingness to concede, their
negotiating strategies (e.g., the dollar amounts of their negotiating limits and targets),
and, ultimately, the final negotiated settlement amounts. This suggests the following
hypothesis:
H3:

Lawyers’ incorrect beliefs about jurors’ standard of care for auditors (H1)
and auditor negligence judgments (H2) will, in turn, lead auditors’ legal
counsel to:
(a) perceive themselves to be in a weaker negotiating position relative
to the opposition,
(b) become more willing to concede on behalf of auditors,
(c) adopt less ambitious negotiating goals and negotiating limits in
out-of-court settlement negotiations for auditors, and
(d) anticipate higher final financial settlement amounts for auditors to
pay out,
when estimate uncertainty is higher than when estimate uncertainty is
lower.

Figure 4.1 shows the theoretical structural model suggested by my theory and H3.
Specifically, the model in Figure 4.1 posits that higher estimate uncertainty will
(incorrectly) lead attorneys to believe that jurors would hold auditors to a higher standard
of care, which would lead to higher juror negligence judgments against auditors, which
would weaken the attorney’s perceived negotiating position (as legal counsel for the
auditors), which lead them to adopt less ambitious negotiating goals and limits for
auditors’ payouts, and, ultimately, anticipate higher final settlement amounts for auditors
to pay out. In addition, since variance is likely to exist in how “tough,” “aggressive,” or
“ambitious” negotiating attorneys are (relative to one another), then more (less) ambitious
negotiating goals would tend to co-occur with more (less) ambitious negotiating limits.
Thus, the theoretical structural model allows negotiating goals and limits to co-vary (i.e.,
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the double-headed arcing arrow in Figure 4.1), in order to control for this predictable
source of variation.17 Besides each link in Figure 4.1 being individually significant, my
theory for H3 suggests that the entire path in Figure 4.1 should be positive and
statistically significant (i.e., indicating that higher estimate uncertainty ultimately leads to
higher final settlement payouts for auditors, through the path posited by H3 and the
model in Figure 4.1).18
Figure 4.1
Theoretical Structural Model

17

Prior negotiation research suggests that negotiation goals, negotiation limits, and expected final
settlement amounts are related but distinct constructs (e.g., Hatfield, Agoglia, and Sanchez 2008, BameAldred and Kida 2007). Accordingly, my theoretical model treats them this way (Figure 2).
18
Significantly positive overall paths can be demonstrated by testing whether the products-of-coefficients
for a path (such as a×b×c×d×e1×f1, a×b×c×d×e2×f2, and a×b×c×d×(e1×f1+e2×f2)) are significantly positive.
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If supported, H3 suggests that auditors’ legal counsel may make unnecessary
concessions during out-of-court settlement, including unnecessary financial costs for
auditors, when estimate uncertainty is high.19 It also suggests for the auditing research
literature that juror judgments alone may be a poor proxy for auditor litigation outcomes
in the majority of cases that are settled out of court (Table 4.1), and, therefore, an
incomplete proxy for auditor litigation risk overall. More specifically, not only does my
theory suggest that settlement negotiation outcomes may be different from juror
judgments, high estimate uncertainty may even cause them to go in opposite directions.
4.2.4 Disaggregation, Estimate Uncertainty, and Lawyers’ Predictions of Jurors
The second study of my dissertation finds that jurors’ standard of care and
negligence judgments are highest when estimate uncertainty is low and the financial
statements are disaggregated, and relatively lower when either the estimate uncertainty is
high, the financial statements are aggregated, or both (Figure 3.1 and 3.3). H1 and H2
predict that lawyers’ predictions of jurors judgments will go systematically in the wrong
direction with respect to estimate uncertainty. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that lawyers
will predict the joint effect of estimate uncertainty and financial statement aggregation on
jurors’ judgments (i.e., the ordinal interactions in Figure 3.1 and 3.3). Experts are poor at
predictions in general (e.g., Meehl 1986), and their predictions become increasingly poor
as they attempt to predict interactive effects (e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997). Thus,
while experts are unlikely to predict jurors judgments correctly with respect to estimate
Archival legal research suggests that defendants’ legal counsel may often offer too much in concessions,
though the causes of when they do so are not yet well understood. For example, Kiser et al. (2008, 567)
examine 2,043 civil lawsuits that went to trial following failed negotiations, and find that in a full 61.2% of
those cases, defendant legal counsel made unnecessarily generous settlement offers during negotiations
than they needed to based on trial outcomes. My study potentially illuminates when and why auditors’ legal
counsel may make unnecessary concessions during out-of-court negotiations, and my conclusions also
extend to the majority of cases that are settled out of court without going to trial (Table 1).
19
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uncertainty (H1 and H2), they are also unlikely to predict jurors’ judgments correctly as a
joint function of low estimate uncertainty and financial statement disaggregation. This
suggests the following hypotheses:
H4:

Auditors’ legal counsel will not correctly predict the joint effect of low
estimate uncertainty and financial statement disaggregation on jurors’
standard of care for auditors or on jurors’ negligence judgments.

In fact, whether or how financial statement disaggregation will influence lawyers’
predictions of juror judgments at all is unclear. Disaggregation changes the relative size
of a material misstatement when compared to its own financial statement line-item, but
not when compared to earnings, sales, earnings per share, total assets, total liabilities,
total equity, retained earnings, or other prominent line-items. The second study of my
dissertation finds that disaggregation of a material misstatement affects jurors’
perceptions of its effects on the fair presentation of its line-item, and, in turn, jurors’
perceptions on the fair presentation of the financial statements as a whole. However,
lawyers may feel that, once a misstatement has passed the hurdle that it can be
characterized for jurors as material, jurors may be focused on that characterization, but
after that will be insensitive to variation relative materiality. This viewpoint would be
consistent with my theory that lawyers likely adopt a perspective of jurors as highly naïve
and relatively insensitive to variation in finer gradations of materiality. If so, they would
under-appreciate the sensitivity that jurors actually show to aggregation. This suggest the
following research question:
RQ1: Will financial statement disaggregation influence lawyers’ predictions of
jurors’ standard of care for auditors or jurors’ negligence judgments?
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4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Participants
Because I am hypothesizing differences between jurors' judgments and lawyers’
out-of-court settlement negotiations, I sought highly experienced lawyers with relevant
expertise as participants for this study. To facilitate their participation, the experiment
was administered through Qualtrics® online software, with a single link that randomly
assigned participants to different experimental conditions. To obtain primary contacts for
recruiting participants, a high-level senior executive at one of the world’s largest and
most prestigious commercial and investment banking firms assisted me with his personal
contacts of 31 highly experienced and established senior-partner-level lawyers at major
corporate law practices. I supplemented this primary contact list with another 11 firstand second-degree connections of my own. In all, I directly contacted 39 lawyers as
primary contacts, asking them to participate in the study themselves and to share the
Qualtrics® link with their colleagues who also have legal negotiation experience and
expertise in corporate law. Of these 39 contacts, 31 are in law practices, while eight serve
as counsel for corporations. Of the 31 attorneys in law practices, all came from firms
practicing commercial litigation, and 14 came from Am Law 200 firms, the top 200
grossing law firms in the United States. The primary contacts generally indicated
willingness to participate in the study and/or to share the link with their colleagues.
One hundred seventy-seven lawyers clicked on the Qualtrics® link but dropped
out at the Informed Consent page, while another 87 lawyers gave their consent and began
the study, with 74 completing the study. The participants had, on average, 21.4 years of
legal experience and 13.5% of them were female. The post-experimental questionnaire
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asked participants to rate their relative level of familiarity with civil proceedings,
business law, torts, and negligence on a scale from 1 to 10 and also asked them a freeresponse question to provide their personal specializations. The participants indicated
high levels of familiarity with civil proceedings (7.61), business law (8.07), torts (6.96),
and negligence (7.65) (all significantly above the mid-point of the scale, p-values <
0.001), 95% explicitly mentioned specializations in business, corporate, or securities law
in their answers to the free-response question, and 58% explicitly mentioned litigation as
a specialization.20 Thus it appears that the participants have appropriate knowledge and
experience to make legal judgments and decisions in my experimental setting.
4.3.2 Task and Manipulations
The attorney participants read a legal case in which investors alleged auditor
negligence leading to a material misstatement in audited financial statements. To
facilitate comparison of attorneys’ judgments to jurors’ judgments, I adapted the
experimental materials from the second study of my dissertation, which had mock jurors
read and decide the same case.
I use a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. I manipulate the level of
estimate uncertainty in the account that gave rise to the alleged misstatement (high vs.
low). In addition, I also manipulate the level of disaggregation of the misstatement.
Specifically, I manipulate whether the misstated account appeared as its own line-item on

20

The free-response specialization required that lawyers unpromptedly mention litigation among their
specializations, and consequently this measure is likely to understate the proportion with litigation
experience. My results and conclusions do not systematically depend on whether lawyers explicitly
mentioned specialization in litigation and/or business, corporate, or securities law in their answers to the
free-response question.
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the income statement (disaggregated) or combined with other accounts into a single
financial statement line-item (aggregated; see Libby and Brown 2013; FASB 2010).21
At the beginning of the case, participants were informed that they would be
assume the role of legal counsel for the auditors and be asked for their legal judgment on
the case. The attorney participants were also told that the case had also been presented to
college students in the role of mock jurors, and that research in accounting, law, and
psychology shows that college students are good proxies for jurors, forming judgments
similar to jurors in negligence settings.22 The materials also told the attorney participants
that the mock jurors averaged 2.51 years of post-high school education and that 44%
were female.
The experimental materials then provided the attorney participants with
background information that explained basic auditing concepts (such as material
misstatements, clean audit opinions, reasonable assurance, audit procedures, etc.), as well
as five related comprehension questions that the mock jurors had also read (adapted from
Peecher and Piercey 2008). For each comprehension question, the attorney participants
were shown the percentage of mock jurors who had answered the question correctly
(which ranged from 95.1% to 99.5% for individual comprehension questions). Thus,

21

The second study of my dissertation manipulates these variables and also the size of the material
misstatement (i.e., a quantitatively and qualitatively material misstatement vs. a much larger material
misstatement). They find that low estimate uncertainty and disaggregation jointly increase jurors’ standard
of care for auditors and auditor negligence judgments. These effects occur similarly for extremely large vs.
more normal material misstatements. For this experiment, I selected the more normal-sized material
misstatement for attorneys to evaluate (see footnote 3 for more details).
22
Specifically, meta-analyses across many juror research studies show that undergraduates’ and jurors’
judgments are similar across a variety of task factors and contexts (Bornsein 1999; Zickafoose and
Bornstein 1999). The accounting research that uses both undergraduates and wider samples of jury-eligible
adults replicates this similarity in their judgments (e.g., Cornell, Warne and Eining 2009; Grenier, Pomeroy
and Stern 2015, Kadous 2001). As a result, accounting research commonly uses college students as mock
jurors (e.g., Kadous and Mercer, 2012; Reffett 2010; Peecher and Piercey 2008; Grenier, Pomeroy and
Reffett, 2012).
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lawyer participants knew that the mock jurors had a basic understanding of the concepts
surrounding an auditor negligence case and had paid attention.
Participants then read about a fictional mining company, Big Time Gravel, which
had been audited by Jones & Company (adapted from Kadous 200, 2001; Peecher and
Piercey 2008). A large portion of the company’s assets was mining equipment that was
highly customized to the company’s mines, quarries, and processing sites, and therefore
did not have readily available market prices. As a result, the management of the mining
company used mathematical valuation models to estimate the fair value of the machinery
and determine whether an impairment loss should be recorded.
In the high estimate uncertainty condition, participants were told that the model is
based on highly subjective and very complicated assumptions about the cash that the
machinery will generate as well, as other difficult projections about the unpredictable
future costs of operating the machinery. As a result, the auditors estimated the value of
the machinery to be between $350 and $650 million.
In the low estimate uncertainty condition, participants were told that the model is
based on highly objective and straightforward assumptions about the cash that the
machinery will generate as well as other simple projections about the predictable future
costs of operating the machinery. The auditors in this condition estimated the value of the
machinery to be between $450 and $550 million.
In all conditions, the company recorded the value of the machinery at $545
million, which resulted in a $10 million impairment loss. Jones & Company issued an
unqualified audit opinion on Big Time Gravel's financials.
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Next, the case described the alleged misstatement in the financial statements that
resulted in the lawsuit. After the audited financial statements were issued, Big Time
Gravel’s mining machinery went down, creating high costs of repair and lost revenue.
The investors allege that the poor condition of the machinery should have been apparent
to the auditors during the audit of the financial statements, before the financial statements
were issued with a clean opinion. Witnesses for the investors testified that, based on
information the auditors should have recognized, the true value of the machinery should
have been $495 million, and that the impairment loss should have been $60 million,
rather than $10 million. The $50 million misstatement exceeds 0.5% of sales, a
quantitative materiality threshold used commonly in practice (Eilifsen and Messier 2015).
In addition, the misstatement allowed Big Time Gravel to meet (rather than just miss)
analysts’ forecasts, making the misstatement qualitatively material as well as
quantitatively (SEC 1999). The investors alleged further that if the loss of $60 million
was to have been recorded by the company, they would have not remained invested in the
company.
Finally, following the case materials from the second study of my dissertation,
participants read an excerpt from Big Time Gravel’s income statement. To show the
alleged misstatement, separate columns showed the numbers as reported in the audited
financial statements, the numbers as the investors alleged that they should have been
reported, and the difference between the two, in dollars and in percentages. In the
aggregated financial statement conditions, the alleged misstatement in impairment loss
was aggregated with other financial statement accounts into a single “Cost of goods sold”
line-item. In the disaggregated conditions, “Cost of goods sold” was broken down into
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multiple separate line-items, including a separate line-item for the impairment loss on the
machinery. This disaggregation manipulation follows an exemplar provided by FASB
(2010) extremely closely, which disaggregates “Cost of goods sold” in almost exactly the
same way. This manipulation is also similar to the disaggregation manipulation of Libby
and Brown (2013). Four lawyers with 38 years of legal experience combined (including a
former law school dean and a U.S. district court clerk) reviewed the experimental
materials to ensure that the information would be admissible in court as presented in the
case.
4.3.3 Response Variables
After reviewing the financial statements, the attorneys made several judgments
related to the legal settlement of the Jones & Company audit of Big Time Gravel.
Specifically, for testing H1, the instrument measured attorneys’ predictions of the mock
jurors’ standard of care for the auditors (Perceived Juror Standard of Care). Specifically,
attorney’s predicted the mock jurors’ beliefs about how likely it is (on a scale from 1 to
10) that a properly conducted audit could have correctly valued the machinery and its
related impairment loss. Following the example of the second study of my dissertation, I
label this judgment the jurors’ “standard of care,” since, the more likely a properly
conducted audit could have correctly valued the machinery, the higher a standard of care
jurors are holding auditors to for failing to do so. For testing H2, the instrument measured
attorneys’ predictions of the mock jurors’ auditor negligence judgments, on a scale from
1 to 10 (Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments). These two response variables also
allow me to test H4 and RQ1.
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For testing H3, the instrument developed several measures of the out-of-court
settlement negotiation process. This included three measures of the attorney’s perceptions
of the strength of the auditor’s out-of-court settlement negotiating position relative to the
opposition’s negotiation (for a latent variable Perceived Negotiating Position).
Specifically, the instrument gathered perceptions of the absolute strength of the auditor’s
negotiating position (very weak vs. very strong), the absolute strength of the opposition’s
negotiating position (very weak vs. very strong), and the relative favorability of the
auditors’ settlement position compared to the opposition’s (favor the investors vs. favor
the auditors), all on scales from 1 to 10. The instrument also gathered three measures of
the attorney’s willingness to concede on behalf of the auditors during negotiations (for a
latent variable Willingness to Concede). Specifically, the instrument asked attorneys to
rate (on scales from 1 to 10) how committed they would be (as auditors’ legal counsel) to
their initial settlement offer (very weakly committed vs. very strongly committed), and
how willing they would be to make concessions to reach a settlement with investors’
legal counsel (very unwilling vs. very willing). In addition, attorneys rated the range of
settlement amounts that would be acceptable to them, on a scale starting at 0 for “no
acceptable range” to 10 (“the acceptable range would be very large”). Finally, to test H3,
attorneys indicated (as legal counsel for the auditors) the lowest amount they would hope
to convince the investors’ legal counsel to accept as a proposed settlement (Minimum
Payout Goal), the highest amount they would be willing to offer the investors’ legal
counsel as a proposed settlement (Maximum Payout Limit), and the final negotiated
settlement amount they expected between themselves and the investors’ legal counsel
(Final Settlement Amount). All three of these amounts were measured in millions of
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dollars, and the Final Settlement Amount also gave participants the option of responding
with “We would not be able to reach a final negotiated settlement amount.” These goals,
limits, and final settlement amount response variables are consistent with similar
measures used in other accounting negotiation research (e.g., Hatfield, Agoglia, and
Sanchez 2008, Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007).
In addition, the instrument gathered additional supplementary measures related to
the negotiation process, each one discussed in the Results section, next. Finally, the
attorney’s responded to manipulation checks and demographic questions.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Likelihood of Being Settled out of Court
The instrument asked all attorneys to assess the likelihood that the lawsuit against
“Jones & Company would end up being settled out of court as opposed to, e.g., going to
trial”. On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely), participants’ mean rating was
8.55, significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t = 20.47, p < 0.001). In addition, the
attorneys rated how much overlap they thought there would be in the range of settlement
amounts that would be acceptable to both them and to the investors’ legal counsel, on a
scale from 0 (there would be no overlap) to 10 (there would be complete overlap). The
attorneys indicated that there would be a significant amount of overlap (mean 4.24, t =
21.77, p < 0.001). In fact, no attorneys selected “no overlap,” suggesting that settlement
negotiations would be unlikely to reach an impasse and go to trial. Finally, my dependent
variable Final Settlement Amount gave attorneys the option of responding with “We
would not be able to reach a final negotiated settlement amount” rather than provide a
dollar figure. Only six out of 74 responses selected this option. Thus, it appears that this
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case would most likely be settled out of court, consistent with most lawsuits in my
analysis (Table 4.1) of Palmrose’s (1999) archival database.
4.4.2 Perceptions of Materiality and Estimate Uncertainty
The misstatement is material according to quantitative benchmarks common to
practice (Eilifsen and Messier 2015), as well as qualitative benchmarks (SEC 1999). To
test whether attorneys perceived the alleged misstatement to be material, the instrument
asked how material of an effect the alleged misstatement had on the judgment of a
reasonable person relying on the financial statements (Materiality−Overall), on a scale
from 1 (no material impact) to 10 (a highly material impact). Despite being counsel for
the auditors, the attorneys acknowledged that the alleged misstatement was significantly
material (mean = 3.46, t = 12.12, p < 0.001), with 71 out of 74 responses (96%)
acknowledging a material impact.
As a manipulation check for disaggregation, the instrument also asked the
attorneys how material of an impact the alleged misstatement had on the financial
statement line-item it appeared in (Materiality−Line-item), on a similar scale from 1 to
10. As expected, the misstatement appeared to have a more material impact on its lineitem in the disaggregated condition than in the aggregated condition (4.38 vs. 3.17, t =
2.17, p = 0.017), with the means of both conditions indicating a significantly material
effect of the misstatement on its line-item (p’s < 0.001). Furthermore, the effect of
disaggregation on the materiality−line-item, in turn, increases attorney’s perceptions of
the overall impact of the misstatement on the judgment of a reasonable person relying on
the financial statements (Materiality−Overall) (overall path estimate = 0.233, 95% of
bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates > 0.078, Hayes 2013; Sobel test = 1.97, p = 0.025).
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Thus, it appears that my manipulation of disaggregation was successful, in that it
predictably influenced attorneys’ perceptions of the impact of the material
misstatement.23
To check my manipulation of estimate uncertainty, the instrument asked
participants to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 the degree of uncertainty surrounding the
valuation model’s inputs, assumptions and estimation of the impairment loss. The
attorneys’ uncertainty ratings were significantly higher in the high-uncertainty conditions
than in the low-uncertainty conditions (8.05 vs. 4.61, t = 6.57, p < 0.001). Thus, the
uncertainty manipulation appears to have been successful.24
Because I use them as manipulation checks, both materiality ratings and the
uncertainty ratings appeared at the end of the instrument, right before demographic
questions, and right after all other response variables, with the “back” button suppressed
so that asking the manipulation check questions could not influence attorney’s responses
to any of my dependent variables.

23

Jurors in the second study of my dissertation exhibited similar effects of disaggregation increasing
Materiality−Line-item, which, in turn, increased Materiality−Overall. Directly comparing attorney’s
Materiality−Line-item and Materiality−Overall judgments to those of the jurors in the same four conditions
in the second study of my dissertation, the only significant difference in their judgments is a main effect of
participant type such that jurors, on average, judged the misstatement to have a more material impact on
Materiality−Line-item and Materiality−Overall than did attorneys, across all experimental conditions (p’s <
0.001). This effect likely reflects the directional goals and motivated reasoning of attorneys as legal counsel
for the auditors (Kunda 1990).
24
The uncertainty manipulation also significantly influenced jurors’ perceptions of uncertainty in the
second study of my dissertation (p < 0.001). Comparing attorneys’ and jurors’ judgments directly,
attorneys’ uncertainty ratings appear to be more sensitive than jurors’ to the different levels of estimate
uncertainty. That is, the difference between attorneys’ uncertainty ratings in the high and low uncertainty
conditions (8.05 vs. 4.61) is significantly larger (t = 5.47, p < 0.001) than the same difference in jurors’
ratings (7.63 vs. 5.73). This suggests that attorneys were able to more confidently identify differences in
estimate uncertainty.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and ANOVAs
Auditor’s
Acceptable
Opposition’s
Position
Commitment
Concede
Range of
Negotiating
Relative to
to Initial
to Reach
Settlement
Position
Opposition’s
Offer
Settlement
Amounts
Descriptive statistics: mean, (standard deviation), and [n]

Perceived
Juror
Standard
of Care

Perceived
Juror
Negligence
Judgments

Auditor’s
Negotiating
Position

Maximum
Payout
Limit
(millions)

Minimum
Payout
Goal
(millions)

Final
Negotiated
Settlement
(millions)

Low Estimate
Uncertainty,
Aggregation

4.28
(1.93)
[18]

3.94
(1.59)
[18]

7.62
(1.07)
[21]

3.43
(1.08)
[21]

7.52
(1.25)
[21]

4.90
(2.39)
[21]

4.76
(2.61)
[21]

3.40
(1.73)
[20]

$13.67
($10.72)
[18]

$5.42
($5.11)
[18]

$10.67
($9.01)
[18]

Low Estimate
Uncertainty,
Disaggregation

4.72
(2.22)
[18]

4.28
(1.93)
[18]

7.57
(1.25)
[21]

3.29
(1.10)
[21]

6.71
(1.98)
[21]

4.95
(2.25)
[21]

6.10
(2.26)
[21]

3.71
(1.74)
[21]

16.81
(12.67)
[18]

$7.17
($7.41)
[18]

$14.47
($14.44)
[15]

Low Estimate
Uncertainty

4.50
(2.08)
[36]

4.11
(1.76)
[36]

7.60
(1.16)
[42]

3.36
(1.09)
[42]

7.12
(1.61)
[42]

4.93
(2.32)
[42]

5.43
(2.43)
[42]

3.56
(1.73)
[41]

15.24
(11.70)
[36]

$6.30
($6.26)
[36]

$12.57
($11.73)
[33]

High Estimate
Uncertainty,
Aggregation

5.65
(2.11)
20

5.30
(2.00)
20

7.09
(1.59)
23

4.30
(1.99)
23

6.57
(1.97)
23

4.09
(2.19)
23

6.22
(1.76)
23

5.13
(1.42)
23

21.75
(13.34)
18

$8.78
($14.58)
18

$20.72
($20.67)
16

High Estimate
Uncertainty,
Disaggregation

4.95
(1.99)
20

4.50
(2.14)
20

7.18
(1.53)
22

4.00
(1.48)
22

6.73
(1.58)
22

4.41
(2.15)
22

6.32
(1.59)
22

4.00
(1.38)
22

20.25
(18.51)
20

$8.55
($11.90)
20

$18.13
($16.67)
19

High Estimate
Uncertainty

5.30
(2.05)
[40]

4.90
(2.07)
[40]

7.14
(1.56)
[45]

4.15
(1.73)
[45]

6.65
4.25
(1.78)
(2.17)
[45]
[45]
ANOVA p-values a

6.27
(1.67)
[45]

4.57
(1.40)
[45]

21.00
(15.92)
[38]

$8.67
($13.24)
[38]

$19.43
($18.67)
[35]

0.167

0.038

0.756
0.686

0.874
0.406

Estimate
0.048
0.040
0.063
0.007
0.103
0.081
0.032
0.002
0.043
Uncertainty a
Aggregation
0.788
0.601
0.937
0.482
0.385
0.702
0.112
0.232
0.806
Interaction
0.231
0.207
0.811
0.799
0.193
0.776
0.171
0.036
0.487
a
Estimate uncertainty influences each variable in the direction suggested by my theory, and the associated p-values are one-tailed.
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4.4.3 Hypothesis Tests
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for every response
variable used in my tests of H1 through H4 and RQ1. As the ANOVA results suggest, I
find evidence of a generally consistent main effect of estimate uncertainty increasing
attorney’s predictions of jurors judgment against auditors, decreasing attorney’s
perceived negotiating position, increasing their willingness to concede, increasing the
negotiating goals and limits they have for auditors’ payout to plaintiffs, and increasing
their anticipated final settlement amount. While these initial tests are informative, a more
formal test of my theory across these variables follows, using structural equations
modeling, which provides more powerful tests of my theory by (1) controlling for
measurement error, (2) estimating structural relationships between variables, (3)
estimating the significance of the overall causal path posited by my theory, and (4)
providing goodness of fit estimates between the theoretical structural model and my
theory, none of which are possible using ANOVA analyses alone. I turn to specific
hypothesis tests, next.
H1 (H2) predicts that lawyers will incorrectly predict mock jurors’ standard of
care (negligence judgments) for auditors to be higher when estimate uncertainty is high
than when estimate uncertainty is low. As Table 4.2 shows, Estimate Uncertainty appears
to significantly increase attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care (4.50 vs. 5.30, t =
1.69, p = 0.048) and their Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments (4.11 vs. 4.90, t = 1.77,
p = 0.040).
Comparing these predictions of the mock jurors’ judgments to the actual jurors’
judgments, the attorneys’ beliefs about jurors are systematically incorrect, and, in fact,
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even go systematically in the opposite direction under some conditions. Specifically,
estimate uncertainty caused the mock jurors to decrease (rather than increase) their
Standard of Care for auditors when the financial statements were disaggregated (Figure
3.1, t = −2.64, p = 0.009), and had no significant effect on their Standard of Care
judgments when the financial statements were aggregated (Figure 3.1, t = −0.57, p =
0.57). Similarly, estimate uncertainty caused the mock jurors to decrease (rather than
increase) their Negligence Judgments when the financial statements were disaggregated
(Figure 3.3, t = −1.31, p = 0.096), and had no significant effect on their Negligence
Judgments when the financial statements were aggregated (Figure 3.3, t = 1.09, p = 0.28).
In particular, jurors’ judgments were harshest against auditors in the disaggregated, low
estimate uncertainty condition, which was significantly higher than each of the other
three conditions for both jurors’ Standard of Care (p’s ≤ 0.096; Figure 3.1) and their
Negligence judgments (p’s ≤ 0.076; Figure 3.3). In no case was this true of attorneys’
predictions of jurors’ judgments, which presumed that low estimate uncertainty would
lead to lower (not higher) juror standard of care and negligence judgments. Thus,
estimate uncertainty significantly increased attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care
and Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments, and did so incorrectly. These results support
H1 and H2.
To test H3, I construct a structural equations model of the data to test the
theoretical structural model posited in Figure 4.1. Results of the structural equations
model appear in Figure 4.2. Overall model fit indices are very strong (RMSEA = 0.028,
CFI = 0.993, Tucker-Lewis Index = 0.991, SRMR = 0.076), suggesting that this model
provides an excellent fit to the data (see Brown 2015). The first link in the model shows
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that high Estimate Uncertainty significantly increases attorneys’ Perceived Juror
Standard of Care (a = 0.414, p = 0.036), replicating my tests of H1. Higher Perceived
Juror Standard of Care, in turn, significantly increases Perceived Juror Negligence
Judgments (b = 0.588, p < 0.001). In addition, the product-of-coefficients a×b is
significantly positive (a×b = 0.243, 95% of bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates >
0.028, Hayes 2013; Sobel test = 1.70, p = 0.044), suggesting that high levels of Estimate
Uncertainty increases Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments, doing so through its
effects on Perceived Juror Standard of Care. This result is consistent with my other tests
of H2.
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Figure 4.2
Structural Equation Model
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Figure 4.2, continued
Structural Equation Model

j

Overall path significance test
Path from Estimate Uncertainty to
Final Settlement Amount through
Minimum Payout Goal (i.e., path
through a, b, c, d, e1, f1)
Path from Estimate Uncertainty to
Final Settlement Amount through
Maximum Payout Limit (i.e.,
path through a, b, c, d, e2, f2)
Total path from Estimate Uncertainty
to Final Settlement Amount (i.e.,
through all mediators)

95% one-tailed
bootstrapped
confidence
interval

Predicted
sign

Path
estimate

+

0.180

95% of
bootstrapped
estimates > 0.036

+

0.257

95% of
bootstrapped
estimates > 0.046

+

0.438

95% of
bootstrapped
estimates > 0.099

Test
result
Significant
j

Significant
j

Significant
j

Notes:
a
Estimate Uncertainty is coded using effects coding (cf. Little et al. 2006), and equals 1
for participants in the high uncertainty conditions, −1 otherwise.
b
Perceived Juror Standard of Care represents lawyers’ predictions of mock jurors’
standard of care for auditors in this case (on a 10-point scale).
c
Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments represents lawyers’ predictions of mock jurors’
negligence judgments of the auditors in this case (on a 10-point scale).
d
Perceived Negotiating Position represents a latent variable estimated using three
measured variables, (1) participants’ perceptions of the absolute strength of their own
negotiating position, (2) their perceptions of the absolute strength of the opposing legal
counsel’s negotiating position, and (3) their perceived favorability of their out-of-court
settlement position relative to the opposing legal counsel’s (all on 10 point scales). The
second of these variables was reverse-coded, so that higher values indicate a stronger
position relative to the opposition.
e
Willingness to Concede represents a latent variable estimated using three measured
variables, lawyers’ (1) willingness to make concessions to reach a settlement with the
investors’ legal counsel, (2) level of commitment to their initial settlement offer (both
rated on 10 point scales), and (3) acceptable range of negotiation outcomes. The second
of these variable was reverse coded, since, the lower the level of commitment to an
initial settlement offer, the more willingness there is to make further concessions from
the initial offer.
f
Minimum Payout Goal represents lawyers’ lowest payout they would hope to convince
the investor’s legal counsel to accept as a proposed settlement, in $ millions. Larger
values represent larger minimum payouts sought (i.e., less ambitious goals).
g
Maximum Payout Limit represents lawyers’ highest payout they would be willing to
offer investors’ legal counsel as a proposed settlement, in $ millions.
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Figure 4.2, continued
Structural Equation Model
h

i

j

The estimated covariance between Minimum Payout Goal and Maximum Payout Limit
(represented in the model by the double-headed arcing arrow) controls for individual
reasons why lawyers’ goals and limits would co-vary. Specifically, since some lawyers
are likely to be “tougher” negotiators than others (i.e., individual variability exists), I
expect that more (less) ambitious individual negotiating goals would tend to co-occur
with more (less) ambitious individual negotiating limits. As expected, this covariance is
positive and significant (p < 0.001).
Final Settlement Amount represents the final negotiated amount that auditors’ lawyers
expect the auditors to settle for and pay to investors, in $ millions.
The overall paths are tested using bootstrapping procedures (cf. Preacher, Rucker and
Hayes 2007; Hayes 2013). This bootstrapping procedure took 5,000 subsamples of the
experimental sample, estimating the structural equation model and its path coefficients
5,000 times. Within a single subsample, an overall path is tested using the products of
its path coefficients, for which signed expectations can be formed. Across all 5,000
subsamples, the procedure counts the number of subsamples that generated an overall
path coefficient with the expected sign. If at least 95% of the subsamples generated a
signed overall path coefficient in the expected direction (i.e., if the 95% bootstrapped
confidence interval does not contain zero), then the overall path is significant (e.g.,
Hayes 2013).
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H3 suggests that the effects of Estimate Uncertainty on Perceived Juror Standard
of Care and Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments will, in turn, decrease the attorney’s
perceptions of their negotiating position as legal counsel for the auditors, leading to more
willingness to concede, higher negotiated payout goals and limits, and, ultimately, higher
final settlement outcomes expected for the auditor to pay. As discussed in Section IV (see
also Table 4.2), I use three measures of attorneys’ perceived negotiation position to
construct the latent variable Perceived Negotiation Position, and three measures of
attorneys’ willingness to concede to construct the latent variable Willingness to
Concede.25
As the results in Figure 4.2 show, the effect of Estimate Uncertainty increasing
Perceived Juror Standard of Care and, in turn, Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments
led to a decrease in the attorney’s Perceived Negotiating Position (c = −0.357, p < 0.001).
This decrease in Perceived Negotiating Position, in turn, leads to an increase in the

25

Perceived Negotiating Position and Willingness to Concede are estimated using effects coding for latent
variables within confirmatory factor analysis (Little, Slegers and Card 2006). The three measures used
for Perceived Negotiating Position are: (1) lawyers’ perceptions of the absolute strength of their own
negotiating position, (2) their perceptions of the absolute strength of the opposing legal counsel’s
negotiating position, and (3) their perceived favorability of their out-of-court settlement position relative
to the opposing legal counsel’s. The second of these three variables was reverse coded, so that higher
values of this latent variable indicate that the lawyers perceive that they are in a stronger negotiating
position relative to the opposing legal counsel. As expected, the factor loadings for each of these
variables are positive and significant (0.983, 0.015 and 1.002, respectively; p’s < 0.001). The three
measures used for Willingness to Concede are: (1) lawyers’ willingness to make concessions to reach a
settlement with the investors’ legal counsel, (2) lawyers’ level of commitment to their initial settlement
offer, and (3) lawyers’ acceptable range of negotiation outcomes. The second of these variable was
reverse coded, since, the lower the level of commitment to an initial settlement offer, the more
willingness there is to make further concessions from the initial offer. As expected, the factor loadings
for each of these variables are positive and significant (1.068, 1.046, and 0.886, respectively; p’s <
0.001). Convergent and divergent validity tests using either CFA or EFA measurement approaches
suggest that the three measures used for each of these latent variables relate to the same construct, and
measure constructs that are distinct from the other constructs in this SEM (see, e.g., Harrington 2009). As
latent variables, Perceived Negotiating Position and Willingness to Concede are represented in the Figure
3 by ovals, following SEM graphing norms (e.g., Brown 2015).
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attorneys’ Willingness to Concede (d = −0.833, p < 0.001).26 This increase in attorney’s
Willingness to Concede leads attorneys adopt less ambitious negotiation strategies, in the
form of larger Minimum Payout Goals and Maximum Payout Limits for out-of-court
settlement negotiations (e1 = 3.330, p = 0.029; and e2 = 6.330, p = 0.001; respectively).
Finally, larger Minimum Payout Goals and Maximum Payout Limits both lead to larger
expected Final Settlement Amounts for auditors to pay plaintiffs (f1 = 0.748, p < 0.001;
and f2 = 0.561, p < 0.001; respectively).
As my formal test of H3, I determine whether the entire path depicted in Figure
4.2, starting at Estimate Uncertainty, running through all mediators, and ending at Final
Settlement Amounts is significantly positive (that is, whether Estimate Uncertainty
increases Final Settlement Amounts through the path posited by H3 and my theoretical
model).27 This test is performed by determining whether the product-of-coefficients
a×b×c×d×(e1×f1+e2×f2) is significantly positive. Note that my theoretical model (Figure
4.1) predicts that this product should be positive, or in other words that the hypothesized
path ultimately explains high Estimate Uncertainty causing an increase in Final
Settlement Amounts. As summarized in Figure 4.3, the structural equation model’s
estimate of this overall path product is 0.438, which is significantly positive (95% of
bias-corrected bootstrap estimates > 0.099). This result supports H3.28

The negative coefficient d = −0.833 means that a decrease (increase) in Perceived Negotiating Position
leads to an increase (decrease) in Willingness to Concede. That is, Perceived Negotiating Position and
Willingness to Concede go in opposite directions.
27
This test confirms that the relationships shown in Figure 3 are not simply a chain of unrelated bivariate
correlations, but rather that the effects of Estimate Uncertainty on Perceived Juror Standard of Care flows
through the structural model to each subsequent variable and ultimately to Final Settlement Amounts.
28
In addition, I also test whether the subpath through Negotiating Goals (i.e., a×b×c×d×e1×f1) and the
subpath through Negotiating Limits (i.e., a×b×c×d×e2×f2) in Figure 3 is significantly positive. I find that
each of these subpaths is significantly positive (subpath through Negotiating Goals = 0.180, 95% of biascorrected bootstrapped estimates > 0.036; and subpath through Negotiating Limits = 0.257, 95% of bias26
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This result for H3 also suggests that attorney’s incorrect perceptions of jurors
makes them too willing to concede out of mistaken beliefs about their vulnerability to
jurors when estimate uncertainty is high. The fact that these effects flow through to the
dollar amounts of negotiation goals, limits, and final settlement amounts suggests that
these mistaken beliefs can potentially result in unnecessary financial payouts on the part
of auditors. As Table 4.2 shows, attorneys’ Final Settlement Amount varied from $12.57
million when Estimate Uncertainty is low to $19.43 million when Estimate Uncertainty
is high (t = 1.80, p = 0.038).29 Additional SEM analyses (not tabulated) suggest that the
overall hypothesized path (Figure 4.1) fully mediates the total effect of Estimate
Uncertainty on Final Settlement Amount shown in Table 4.2.30
H4 predicts that attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care and Perceived Juror
Negligence Judgments will not correctly reflect the joint effects of Estimate Uncertainty
and Disaggregation on jurors’ actual judgments (Figure 3.1 and 3.3). RQ1 asks whether
Disaggregation will influence attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care and
Perceived Juror Negligence judgments at all. As Table 4.2 shows, I detect no effects of
Disaggregation (in main effect or interaction) on Perceived Juror Standard of Care or on
Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments. Thus, attorneys’ predictions of mock juror
judgments do not appear to accurately reflect the joint effects of disaggregation and
estimate uncertainty present in mock jurors’ actual judgments (Figure 3.1 and 3.3). These
corrected bootstrapped estimates > 0.046). Note that the two subpath estimates sum to the estimate of the
overall path (i.e., 0.438).
29
By way of comparison, the US Treasury (2008) reports that the largest six accounting firms paid out
$5.66 billion to settle over 362 cases from 1995-2007, an average settlement of $15.64 million per case in
this period. Thus, the attorneys’ in my experiment settled for relatively more for the Jones & Company
audit of Big Time Gravel, but still in an amount similar to cases from 1995-2007.
30
That is, the significant effect of Estimate Uncertainty on Final Settlement Amount (p = 0.038, Table 2)
becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for the significant indirect path depicted in Figure 2 (p =
0.858). More specifically, these supplementary SEM analyses suggest that the indirect path depicted in
Figure 2 accounts for 77.4% of the total effect size of Estimate Uncertainty on Final Settlement Amount.
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results support H4. In addition, with respect to RQ1, as Table 4.2 shows, Disaggregation
does not appear to systematically influence attorneys’ predictions of juror judgments or
any of their resulting negotiation behaviors. Thus, despite Disaggregation significantly
influencing attorneys’ perceptions of Materiality−Line-item, which, in turn, influenced
Materiality−Overall, it does not impact their subsequent negotiation behaviors, likely
because it does not impact their perceptions of juror judgments.
4.4.4 Supplementary Analyses
The instrument asked the lawyers how cooperative or contentious negotiations
would be, on a scale from 1 (more cooperative) to 10 (more contentious), and how long it
would take to negotiate a settlement for this case, on a scale from 1 (a short amount of
time) to 10 (a long amount of time). The lawyers’ mean ratings are 6.45 and 6.32,
respectively, each significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t = 4.96, p < 0.001, and t
= 4.30, p < 0.001, respectively). Thus, the lawyers believed that settlement of this case
would be relatively contentious and take a relatively long time. These ratings did not vary
by experimental condition (p’s ≥ 0.78).
The instrument also asked the lawyers to rate how large the opposing legal
counsel’s range of acceptable settlements would be, on a scale from 0 (no acceptable
range) to 10 (very large). The lawyers expected the opposing side to have a significant
range of acceptable settlements (mean rating = 5.81, t = 25.95, p < 0.001). This rating did
not vary by experimental condition (omnibus F = 0.65, p = 0.59), consistent with prior
research suggesting that, in competitive negotiation settings, thinking through details of
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the opposition’s negotiation strategies is difficult (e.g., Trotman, Wright, and Wright
2005; Bowlin 2011).31
Finally, the instrument measured lawyers’ own beliefs about the proper standard
of care, and lawyers’ own beliefs about auditor negligence, each on scales from 1 to 10.
For both of these measures, lawyers’ beliefs do not vary by experimental condition (p’s ≥
0.36), suggesting that the significant effects of Estimate Uncertainty on lawyers’ Final
Negotiated Settlements are best explained by lawyers’ incorrect predictions of jurors
beliefs (Figure 4.2), rather than by their own beliefs about auditor negligence and the
standard of care. The fact that lawyers are willing to make more financial concessions
during negotiation when estimate uncertainty is high, despite personally believing that the
auditors are no more negligent when estimate uncertainty is high, provides additional
evidence that lawyers tend to make unnecessary auditor payout concessions out of
mistaken beliefs about juror judgments.32
4.5 Conclusion
Findings from this study have important implications for the accounting and
auditing literature on high estimate uncertainty and its effects. As contemporary financial
statements include estimates of increasingly higher uncertainty, accounting researchers
31

In addition, the instrument asked the lawyers to estimate the lowest dollar amount the opposing legal
counsel would be willing to settle for. In this case, I do find a main effect suggesting that they expected the
opposition to be in a stronger negotiating position when Estimate Uncertainty is high (t = 1.38, p = 0.087),
consistent with the rest of my findings. However, I also find a significant Estimate Uncertainty ×
Disaggregation interaction, suggesting that this effect of Estimate Uncertainty may only occur when the
financial statements are aggregated (F = 4.77, p = 0.032). However, this unpredicted interaction is generally
not robust across my dependent variables. Future research may investigate lawyers’ expectations of the
opposition’s negotiating strategies further, including whether this interaction appears persistent or
idiosyncratic.
32
Comparing lawyers’ Standard of Care and Negligence Judgments directly to jurors’ judgments, I find
that (in addition to lawyers not exhibiting the pattern of means shown in Figure 1 for jurors), lawyers’
Standard of Care and Negligence Judgments tend to be lower than jurors’ (p’s < 0.001). As with a similar
difference in materiality perceptions, this result likely reflects lawyers’ directional goals and motivated
reasoning as legal counsel for the auditors (Kunda 1990).
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and practitioners have expressed concern that such high uncertainty will increase auditor
liability to onerous levels (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012). Results of
this study suggest that the impact of high estimate uncertainty on auditor litigation risk
for undetected misstatements goes in opposite directions depending on whether a case is
decided by jurors or settled by attorneys in out-of-court settlement. While high estimate
uncertainty leads jurors to judge auditors less harshly for undetected material
misstatements in relatively disaggregated financial statement line-items in the second
study of my dissertation, results of this study show that lawyers reading the same case as
legal counsel for the auditors tend to concede more in out-of-court settlements when
estimate uncertainty is high. Consistent with my theory, results of the experiment show
that these directionally opposite effects stem from lawyers’ inability to predict jurors’
judgments accurately.
This study also makes important and early contributions to the small literature on
out-of-court settlement to resolve auditor resolution. Little is known about out-of-court
resolution of audit litigation in the accounting literature (Donelson et al. 2014). Findings
of this study demonstrate that auditors’ legal counsel may unnecessarily concede
economically significant financial payouts on behalf of audit firms in response to high
uncertainty, out of mistaken beliefs about juror judgments. Thus, lawyers'
misunderstanding of their clients’ vulnerability to jurors can carry significant and
unnecessary costs for auditors, in the most common venue for resolving auditor
negligence litigation. For example, in this study, high levels of estimate uncertainty led to
an increase in expected final payouts from auditors from $12.57 million to $19.43
million, a 54.6% increase, and results indicated further that attorneys’ (incorrect) beliefs
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about juror judgments in the study primarily accounted for this increase. Such effects
may unnecessarily increase the substantial litigation burden that audit firms face, with the
largest six accounting firms paying $5.66 billion to resolve over 362 cases from 19952007 (US Treasury 2008). In 2007, 15.1% of audit related revenue went to litigation and
practice protection costs (US Treasury 2008).
Of course, this study examines only two experimental factors on lawyers’
judgments. Future research may develop other factors which cause the accuracy of
attorney’s perceptions of vulnerability to juries to improve. The accounting literature
would benefit from additional research building our understanding of out-of-court
settlement, and when it appropriately manages, minimizes, or unnecessarily increases
auditors’ litigation risk. This study provides a theoretical starting point by pointing out
how (consistent with psychology theory) expert-attorneys may overconfidently ascribe
overly simplistic behavioral mental models to novice-jurors’ judgments, underestimating
the extent to which novices are at least boundedly rational as experts may be prone to do
when doing the difficult task of predicting others’ behavior. In addition, this study
identifies estimate uncertainty as an important factor if this phenomenon exists. That is,
boundedly rational jurors may react to high estimate uncertainty in an undetected
misstatement by altering their attributions to audit negligence, altering their attributions
to chance factors, and/or altering the amount of judgment they hold in reserve, consistent
with Attribution Theory. In contrast, if expert attorneys hold an overly simplistic view of
novice jurors, they may simply expect them to react to high estimate uncertainty by
simply attributing more blame to auditors (i.e., as the failed guardians of certainty). Thus,
based on the position that expert attorneys may be poor predictors of novice juror
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judgments, my study tested estimate uncertainty as a factor that may well create
directionally opposite effects on juror judgments versus attorney’s settlements based on
their beliefs about juror judgments. Future research in this under-studied area of out-ofcourt audit litigation settlement can build upon this theoretical foundation by identifying
other accounting task factors and thinking about their implications given the different
perspectives jurors and lawyers bring to the setting. Some may similarly create divergent
effects on auditor liability, given the differences between juror and lawyer judgments,
while others may create convergent effects.
Finally, this study makes an important contribution to the accounting literature on
auditors’ litigation risk overall. Although the vast majority of audit litigation is resolved
out of court (Table 4.1), the vast majority of accounting research on the disposition of
audit litigation has focused on juror judgments. This focus of the literature implicitly (and
sometimes explicitly) assumes that juror judgments are a good proxy for auditors’
litigation risk because out-of-court settlements would presumably reflect when auditors
would or would not be more vulnerable to juries. However, as both accounting and legal
scholars point out, it is not yet well understood how accurate lawyers’ expectations about
juries may be during out-of-court settlement negotiations (e.g., Donelson et al. 2014,
Seabury 2013). Results of this study demonstrate that lawyers’ predictions of juror
judgments can be systematically inaccurate (even in ways that are directionally opposite
to juror judgments), and that these incorrect predictions can in fact roll forward to affect
lawyers’ negotiating strategies and financial concessions on behalf of auditors. Thus, this
study demonstrates that juror judgments are not a good proxy for the litigation risk faced
by auditors in out-of-court settlement negotiations. Thus, just as juror cases present only
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a partial picture of all audit litigation cases (Table 4.1; Palmrose 1999), they also present
only a partial picture of auditors’ litigation risk. My findings may help motivate future
research on out-of-court settlement of auditor litigation, in order to gain a better
understanding of auditors’ litigation risk, which may not always be well proxied by juror
judgments.
Like all empirical research, this study has limitations. There are a number of different
factors that relate to the task, decision-maker, and legal environmental that I do not
examine that could impact my findings. Future research could examine how other factors
may change the effects demonstrated in this study. Nevertheless, this study contributes to
our understanding of the important and yet poorly understood topic of out-of-court
settlement of auditor negligence litigation.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In three independent essays, I examined how estimate uncertainty, financial
statement aggregation, audit quality indicators, a company's investor base, and the size of
the alleged misstatement can impact auditor liability. I find that jurors believe that an
auditor is more likely to be found negligent when the AQIs indicate that the auditor
performed a poor quality audit than when the AQIs are mixed or indicate the auditor
performed a high quality audit. Additionally, I find that jurors believe the auditors is
more likely to be found negligent when the financial statements are disaggregated and
estimate uncertainty is low. In contrast, attorneys mispredict juror judgments and assume
that jurors will hold the auditor to be more negligent when estimate uncertainty is high.
The attorneys then use their misprediction of juror judgment to make unnecessary
concessions in out of court settlement.
These findings have important implications for standard setters, audit
practitioners, litigators, and accounting researchers. While practitioners have expressed
some concern about the mandated disclosure of audit quality indicators, my results
suggest that firms' concerns may be unwarranted as long as they do not perform a poor
quality audit. Additionally, the flexibility provided in financial reporting regulations on
how aggregated the income statement is could provide auditors with legal liability
protection. Finally, while the degree of estimate uncertainty is increasing in the financial
statements, its impact of auditor liability depends on whether a case goes to court and
gets decided by a jury or is settled out of court by attorneys. This is both informative to
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audit firms' legal counsel as they attempt to negotiate fairly for their client and for
accounting researchers as they try to understand factors that impact auditor liability.
There are many promising avenues for future research. It is still unclear how these
five variables could impact other aspects of the auditors' work environment. Future
research could also explore additional factors that might cause attorneys to mispredict
juror judgments. More research is also needed to explore other aspects of pre-trial
settlement negotiations that can influence auditor liability. It is the hope of the author that
researchers will continue to explore many of the important questions raised in this
dissertation.
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